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ABSTRACT

This thesis will explore the relationship between the rise of the Know Nothing
Party and the modernization of St. Louis, the first Western metropolis. By the mid1850s, two distinct visions of St. Louis existed. On one side of the ideological aisle,
Democrats and conservative Whigs cautiously pursued an economic policy that
advocated a slow but steady growth in St. Louis’ city infrastructure. But by 1850, a new
faction of wealthy Yankee merchants, stirred by dreams of empire and western
supremacy, challenged the traditional approach and strategically joined the national
Know Nothing movement.

Influenced by the intellectual currents of the American Revolution, Nativists
engendered a new form of republicanism termed “pure Americanism,” which
incorporated notions of honor and civic virtue that served as a foundation for a myriad of
intellectual and social systems they privately funded across the city. These institutions
defined their vision of a modern city, where order and class distinctions were respected
and private domains served as models for masculine conceptions of behavior and public
propriety. Recasting the character of St. Louis ultimately moved beyond the borders of
Missouri as Nativists explored how St. Louis and the pure Americanism paradigm could
serve as a remedy for the rancorous spirit that had threatened national unity by 1857. The
modern city, the group poignantly argued, would save the country.

Ultimately, this thesis will tell an altogether different story of St. Louis, through
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the successes and dilemmas of the Know Nothing Party as it engineered contemporary
social reform. Utilizing the interplay of class and republican ideology, I will demonstrate
the relationship between conceptions of modernity and westward expansion in
antebellum America.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 1854, the streets of St. Louis buzzed with excitement and anticipation over
the day’s election. For hours, men wearing their best trouser suits and top hats stood in line and
suffered on an unusually hot August afternoon. 1 Election days afforded Missourians the
opportunity to dress in their best attire as they mingled with their political enemies in the
crowded streets and taverns. 2 Indeed, historians have often described election days during the
nineteenth century as a political “middle ground”, where various groups celebrated and
expressed their different visions for the nation in the public arena, through loud drinking parties
in local street taverns, banquets, and celebratory street parades. But socio-economic differences
divided St. Louis, the election atmosphere was darkened by intense class tensions and the
election violence grew increasingly frequent.
The 1854 election was the first congressional race in the state contested by the Know
Nothing Party-- a nativist based oppositional party. The re-election campaign pitted Know
Nothing leader Luther Martin Kennett against “Old Bullion” Thomas Hart Benton, a four term
Democrat and arguably the most powerful political leader in the state. For voters outside the
periphery of the Democratic Party, Benton represented a tradition of Democratic and proSouthern hegemony that had stifled internal improvements in the St. Louis region. Moreover,
Benton’s party relied heavily upon the foreign-born vote. As the foreign vote became
increasingly decisive in St. Louis elections, resentment built among native-born merchants who
felt politically marginalized. Know Nothings capitalized on this feeling during the election and
1

Frank Leslie, Untitled Print, 1859
For a more detailed account of the 1854 riot, see John C. Schneider, “Riot and Reaction in St. Louis: 1854-1856,”
The Missouri Historical Review Vol. 68, Issue 2 (January 1974).
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cast the immigrant as the enemy of American democracy and institutions. The Republican, a
Whig and Know Nothing organ, repeatedly indulged its readers’ fears that immigrants planned to
“Germanize St. Louis.” 3 “The American people” the Republican ominously warned, “will not
stand innovations upon their rights, their principles, their institutions.”4
Although on the surface it appeared that nativism was the defining political issue during
this campaign, the subtext of its rhetoric was rooted in more fundamental disagreements over the
meaning of “republicanism” and what it implied. Know Nothings advocated a distinctly
Missouri form of republicanism that Kennett described as Pure Americanism. 5 This ideology
championed an expansive concept of modernity that included technological innovation, western
industrialization, and even moral perfectionalism. Progress, in this view, depended upon
massive internal improvements and the support of a modern municipal institutional infrastructure
that would reform the minds and morals of St. Louis citizens and regenerate western society into
a model of human self-development. Democrats, however, fundamentally disagreed with such a
vision of governance and campaigned on a platform of restrained government spending and
denounced any form of a bourgeoisie aristocracy. Thus, the 1854 proved to be a pivotal election
in Missouri history where two distinct visions for St. Louis’s future would be decided.
Then came a sequence of events that transformed the political culture in St. Louis and
propeled the Know Nothings into power. It began with a panic. In the weeks before the 1854
election, Know Nothings and their Whig allies initiated a print campaign that underscored the
specter of violence on election day, prophesizing that election day would be met with electoral

3

James Neal Primm, Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri (St. Louis, Missouri: Missouri Historical Society Press,
1998), 177.
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The St. Louis Missouri Republican, August 5, as quoted in Schneider, “Riot and Reaction”, 172.
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corruption and melee. Headlines warned, “Beware of the Illegal Vote” 6 and “Frightful
Anticipation.” 7 Utilizing the threat of a foreign rebellion, the newspaper created an atmosphere
of paranoia and anxiety in the preceding weeks. In no uncertain terms, The Republican warned
that the future of the city lay at the ballot box.
On election day, the growing tension quickly exploded into full-fledged violence after
rumors circulated of corruption at the ballot box. An election judge in the Irish Fifth Ward
delayed the voting process for a number of immigrant voters- a loyal voting bloc for the
Democrats. 8 The long queue of voters grew impatient, and a shove from one bystander led to the
stabbing of another. Events quickly spiraled out of control, with violence spreading throughout
the ward, aided equally by the inflammatory campaign rhetoric and the suffocating heat.
Democrats, frustrated over perceived electoral corruption, responded with small fires and
fisticuffs. Nativists, however, swiftly organized and retaliated against any immigrants within
their purview.
Know Nothings flooded the narrow streets, searching for foreigners in taverns and
barbershops. Along their path they broke windows, burst through doors, and raided businesses,
occasionally trading gunfire with shopkeepers and inn owners attempting, in vain, to protect their
property. The mob marched down Morgan and Second Street-- two main thoroughfares in the
Irish ward-- gathering strength block by block. 9 Within minutes, the group swelled to over a
thousand. They carried axes and guns, a sign they were prepared for a deadly collision. At the
beginning of the riot it was not clear what the mob planned, but once they arrived at the Fifth
Ward they initiated a battle against any Irish or Germans wielding weapons. The Democrat
6

St. Louis Missouri Republican, August 7, 1854.
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described the atmosphere as “the most exciting and terrifying one” as “infuriated masses moving
swiftly along, firing pistols in the air and venting the loudest oaths and exclamations against the
Irish, while the fire bells of the city were ringing and shouts were heard from all parts of the
city.” 10 Nativists announced their arrival as they conquered each street, screaming threats while
wielding brickbats and clubs. 11 What started off as a minor eruption of fisticuffs and stabbings
developed into cultural warfare--immigrants and nativists fighting in hand-to-hand combat for
the future of their city.
Meanwhile, a combination of Irish, German, and zealous Democrats organized a phalanx
on the levee of the Mississippi River. The group, however, was outnumbered and after a quick
confrontation with the mob, dissolved and retreated. Refusing to settle for a draw, Nativists
followed them throughout the narrow streets.
Approximately ten hours after the initial violence erupted, Mayor John How and a police
force arrived to quell the riot, but had little success. St. Louis lacked a professionally organized
police force, and thus the majority of police on the ground were volunteers. 12 Quickly
outnumbered and outflanked, John How issued an executive order for all city officials to retreat,
hoping rioters would lose steam as the hours progressed. This hope proved false, as the riot
ensued for days with no effective means to contain the violence.
Perhaps the riot would have been quelled overnight, if not for the reemergence of the
fears of an immigrant conspiracy stocked by the Republican for weeks. Rumors circulated that a
cavalry of Irish countrymen had arrived on the Mississippi River, ready to replenish their fallen
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countrymen. 13 Nativists responded with renewed vigor, fearful that foreigners would overtake
the city.
Eventually, the nativist group fanned out across the city, occupying popular Irish and
German locales and claiming the locations as if conquests in battle. St. Louis University, the
offices of the Anzieger des Westens (a popular German newspaper), and various Catholic schools
and churches came under attack. With each captured location, the Know Nothings demonstrated
to residents the party’s strength, and their adversary’s impotence.
The throng tore through the community for three full days with a barrage of gunfire,
looting, and arson. As dusk turned to dawn on August 10th, the morning light revealed the full
devastation of the riot. When the mob rested in the late hours of August 9th, ten people were
dead, over twenty critically injured, and significantly more wounded. 14 Irish and German
saloons and pubs had received most of the damage. As one priest, who daringly protected the
front gate of St. Louis University, described the damage: “it is a wonder to us, when we
remember the number of shots fired and the exposed position of the mob, that there were not
double the persons killed and wounded.” 15 Weeks after the riot, unsubstantiated rumors spread
that the death toll was significantly larger. Indeed, the Republican reported bodies washing
along the shoreline of the Mississippi River. 16
Nativists used violence to establish their political legitimacy and viability. Know
Nothings targeted their adversaries’ homes and businesses, either ransacking or destroying the
buildings. Each location was integral for their rivals political activity and socialization. The
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resulting destruction enabled the nativists to shatter their opponents, and pursue reform efforts
without interference. 17 The following days revealed that Kennett had defeated Benton, with the
Republican noting that a regime change would “Regenerate Missouri” and allow its citizens to
“Shake off the ‘old man of the was[sic] who had rested upon her shoulders like a nightmare for
the last thirty years.” 18
Once their opponents’ wards were destroyed, Nativists imagined the rebirth of new
neighborhoods and businesses. A new St. Louis would be devoid of political corruption and the
degenerative influence of imbibing. More importantly, Natives sought to protect the city and its
government from foreign influence-politically and morally. In this respect, Know Nothings
envisioned themselves as agents of progress for all, defending the city’s community from social
disorder and moral decay.
On August 9th, the City Council, filled with Know Nothing stalwarts, held a public
meeting to make sense of the riot, and plan for the future. Not only did Nativists control the
meeting, they effectively re-cast the memory of the preceding days and established themselves as
the party of order and peace in St. Louis. The reforms discussed during the meeting were the
temporary closing of all liquor stores and saloons, tighter liquor laws, and the first step toward a
professionally organized police force. All of these suggestions would later serve the direct
purposes of the Know Nothing Party. Nativists characterized their adversaries as violent
deviants and shifted the blame of the riot onto the Irish. 19 In a note of irony, the violence
inflicted by the Know Nothings would offer them their biggest political opportunity. Reform,

17
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Know Nothings argued, needed to be accomplished swiftly and under the guidance and control
of the ruling merchant class who were conveniently its own party leaders.
St. Louis Know Nothings did not remain alone. Across the nation, Know Nothingism
quickly spread like wildfire. Beginning as a secret, fraternal order, members devised elaborate
initiation rites and oaths in order to maintain the society’s privacy. 20 When a stranger asked a
member about the order, the member was instructed to respond, “I know nothing.” 21 Often,
newspapers would end editorials with a short statement, stating: “We know nothing.” – a public
show of support for the order. 22
The secret society quickly found roots across the country, with multiple lodges in cities
and states, and the movement soon evolved into an organized party called the Know Nothing or
American party, sweeping local and state elections on a loosely organized platform of nativism
and citizenship reform. The new party appealed to disaffected Whigs and Democrats looking for
a competitive national party to rival the Democratic Party.
The national Know Nothing platform remained relatively simple, reflecting their Nativist
roots. Of the principles that formed the platform, each attempted to limit and exclude political
participation by foreigners. Later, as the fragility of the Union became more apparent, the Know
Nothing Party stressed the last addendum to its platform: an allegiance to the Union above all
other issues. Regardless of the state or section, the Unionist portion of the platform was shared

20

Mark Dash, “Notes and Documents: New Light on the Dark Lantern: The Initiation Rites and Ceremonies of a
Know-Nothing Lodge in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography Vol.
127, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), 89-93.
21
Michael Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (NY: Wiley, 1978), 156.
22
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Sociology Vol. 27, No. 1 (July 1921), 71-85.
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by a majority of Know Nothings and defined the group’s political ambitions during its last years
as an organization. 23
The Know Nothing movement revealed a growing disillusionment among antebellum
Americans over the state of their Union. The Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas Nebraska Act
of 1854 provoked residents of the North and the South to view the system as broken-or worse,
catering to one section. Nativists in Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana, Maryland, and Illinois
found an allegiant electorate; eager to restore a sense of equanimity the group had thus far found
lacking. For a brief period of time, nativism offered an embittered electorate a distraction from
the issue of slavery.
The first attempt by historians to examine the Know Nothing party in America started in
the early twentieth century. During the 1920’s, Richard Purcell at Washington University in St.
Louis supervised dozens of case studies of Know Nothingism throughout the United States. 24
The “Purcell School” emphasized the proscriptive policies of the organization but ignored its
political impact the party had. As historian Jean Baker points out, “the Know-Nothings were
described in terms of their public policies, and there was little effort to examine the groups
supporting the party or the clash of human values.” 25 The Purcell school failed to penetrate the
movement’s political aspirations, and its analysis lacked a deeper investigation into the
movement’s ideological motivations.

23

George H. Haynes, “The Causes of Know-Nothing Success in Massachusetts” The American Historical Review
Vol. 3, No. 1 (Oct., 1897), 67.
24
Jean H. Baker, Ambivalent Americans: The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1977), xii.
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8

Historians did not begin to recognize the importance of nativism in antebellum America
until the late sixties. Beginning with Michael Holt and the “new political history,” 26 historians
began to approach the organization in a different way--by emphasizing the ethno-cultural divide
in antebellum America. 27 The new political history movement thrust nativism into forefront of
the political crisis of the 1850s. Just a decade later, Holt stressed the party’s influence in the
political system and argued that not only did Americans embrace nativism, the Know Nothing
Party offered the last opportunity to salvage a cross sectional alliance. 28 Nativism became a
chord that connected the North and the South.
Yet other scholars point to the differences in Northern and Southern nativism. Historian
Tyler Anbinder, author of the most complete synthesis of Northern Know Nothingism, argues
that it was deeply rooted in a fervently moral Protestantism. Instead of trying to establish
nationalism, they focused their attention on features of labor reform and anti-slavery. 29 Their
platform explains their quick absorption into the Republican Party-the party of anti-slavery and

26
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party system.
28
Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, 158.
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free labor ideology. 30 Unlike the South where Know Nothingism was essentially maskedWhiggery, 31 the northern sect had a much larger mixture of Democrats and Whigs.
The southern Know Nothings had drastically different membership and political
influence than its counterpart in the North. Darrell Overdyke has produced the most complete
narrative of the Know Nothing Party in the South. 32 His book argues that the South did not
embrace the secret order as vehemently as the North. Instead, the party served more as a
pressure group, with mild success in local elections. James H. Broussard has noted Southern
states embraced Know Nothingism primarily because it was the only effective means in which to
establish nationalism in the South. 33 This assumption is plausible given that prior to the
secession crisis, Southern Know Nothings were the strongest supporters of the Union and swore
an oath of allegiance to support of it. Importantly, nativism did not play an integral role in the
Southern American parties’ politics. In many states, including Louisiana, immigrants and
Catholics joined the party and played an active role in campaigning. 34
Although historians and scholars separate the Know Nothings by region, they have all
embraced the idea that Know Nothings operated insularly, with an emphasis on local events and
politics. This phenomenon explains the vast amount of regionally focused studies of Know
Nothing parties. According to Michael Holt’s work, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, this

30
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flexibility allowed Know Nothings to establish cross-sectional ties. 35 Although the group’s
platform varied from state to state, Know Nothings looked inward for political motivation, and
not toward national events.
The Missouri Know Nothings, however, remained distinct from their fellow national
members, both in their ideology and political aspirations. My study will challenge the
traditional, local approach, and argue that Missouri Know Nothings maintained a strong interest
in national events, in order to transform national politics from the state level. The Know Nothing
party in St. Louis actively tried to form a new brand of American character and identity in the
city that was exclusively white, Anglo-Saxon, and untainted by the corruption that seemingly
infiltrated the Whig and Democratic parties in other states. Nativists considered their political
party a means of establishing civic duty, public virtue, and genteel behavior, qualities they
imagined would encourage reform among urban cities across America.
But what prompted St. Louis Nativists to consider themselves unique, and therefore
particularly equipped for the challenge of remaking American character? The answer lies within
the history of Missouri, and the theory of manifest destiny. Manifest Destiny, defined broadly, is
the belief in American exceptionalism and progress through continued expansion. 36 This
ideology remained deeply embedded in Missourians’ identity and consciousness. 37 Missouri
residents were already preconditioned to believe that they were different, the products of a grand
experiment by politicians in Washington and moneymen from the North. St. Louis occupied the
minds of countless Americans, anxiously awaiting the prognosis of expansionism in the West.
35

Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, 164-166.
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Nativists displayed a drive to attain the ideological promise of Manifest Destiny, and directed
their ambitions toward establishing St. Louis as the moral capital of America.
My study of Know Nothingism in St. Louis, Missouri therefore emphasizes an
overlooked period in antebellum political history when Americans did not consider disunity and
fracture inevitable and engaged in a cooperative effort to regenerate republican ideals in order to
establish nationalism both in the region, and later, throughout the fractured country. Through a
political paradigm termed Pure Americanism, Nativists blended republican principles with
Manifest Destiny to form a distinctly Missouri form of republicanism that advocated a wideranging movement toward modernity. What followed was the development of a modern welfare
state-including pubic and post-secondary education, public health authorities, and centralized
municipal bureaucracy. Although this vision supported city-wide reform, Nativists hoped in
time their institutional model for city order would catch fire across the country, increasing the
cultural similarities and ignoring the differences that threatened to divide the Union.
Several factors distinguish St. Louis from other urban cities and make it the ideal setting
for a case study. First, the city acted as the main access point to the burgeoning American West,
and in consequence, constituted a middle ground for both Southern and Northern influences.
Historians have noted this peculiarity and characterized Missouri as culturally Southern, with a
Northern economic impulse. 38 Historian Adam Arenson has aptly noted, “Northerners and
southerners, European immigrants and free and enslaved African Americans- as a booming
metropolis in a border state, St. Louis’s demographic stew mirrored the nation’s regional,
political, and ethnic diversity as no other city did.” 39 Missourians learned how to negotiate and

38
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build a dialogue that moved beyond a sectional divide. 40 For many migrants flowing into the
city, St. Louis symbolized a fresh start for a nation quickly succumbing to sectional tension.
Some historians have used the label middle ground to describe their micro-histories,
perhaps too liberally. 41 A middle ground, according to Richard Whige, is “in between cultures,
peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate[sic] world of villages….On the middle ground
diverse peoples adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative, and often
expedient, misunderstandings.” 42 Missouri was purposefully colonized and developed through a
cooperative effort by Northern and Southern interests. 43 Differences were settled through
accommodation and acculturation, a sharp contrast from the ideologically polarized North and
South. If any setting could be regarded as the mirror image of the cultural and political
demographics of America, it could and should be Missouri.
Furthermore, St. Louis’ geographic location, situated on the Mississippi River, naturally
defined the city as a magnet for immigrants. Over the course of two decades, from 1840 to 1860,
St. Louis received a large influx of immigrants, mostly of Irish and German descent. 44 Germans
established a lively and semi-prosperous community in St. Louis. The Irish however, suffered
from generations of European and American prejudices and failed to establish economic
autonomy like the Germans. Instead, they competed with blacks-either free or enslaved- for low

40
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wage positions but found moderate success in local politics. St. Louis, for both the Germans and
Irish, offered the same promises that enticed Natives, and they came in droves.
The story of the Know Nothings offers a unique framework to analyze the significant
development stages of St. Louis as it transformed into a powerful metropolis and cultural symbol
for Manifest Destiny. During this period of remarkable development, the community faced an
explosion in population growth, class stratification, and the development of a state party system,
all of which played a significant role in the rise of the Know Nothing Party. In order to illustrate
the kinship between St. Louis modernity and the Know Nothing Party, I have organized the
following chapters chronologically. The first chapter will trace the economic and cultural
background of St. Louis, the various factors that enticed migrants to Missouri, and the
development of a thriving nativist culture that solidified class divisions in the region. The
second chapter will recount the rise of the Know Nothing Party, including the 1854
congressional election between Thomas Hart Benton and Kennett that sparked the bloody
Nativist riot that marks the entry of the Know Nothing Party as a political force in St. Louis.
Chapter Three details the organized effort of Nativists to create a social welfare institutional
infrastructure and cleanse the city of corruption and urban decay. Natives hoped the extensive
reforms would define their city as the new moral capital of America. The last chapter will
examine the eventual failure of the Know Nothing Party to maintain political hegemony in St.
Louis as the issue of slavery re-shaped city politics.
The study of the Know Nothing Party in St. Louis not only reflects the people’s growing
dissatisfaction with the political order, but offers an important insight into their world view and

14

aspirations for the Union. Know Nothings dreamed of a “City upon a Hill” with Missourians
leading the future of American democracy and morality, amid a nation in chaos. 45

45
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CHAPTER 2
FORGING A FUTURE ON SHAKY GROUND
Thomas P. Otter’s 1860 landscape portrait On the Road is perhaps one the most
renowned images of the nineteenth century Missouri frontier. 1 A powerful railroad and a
teetering wagon lurch toward the glowing western edge of the basin as a lush, fertile land beckon
future settlers to conquer and domesticate. Painted a mere two decades after a swell of migrants
seized upon the region, landscape portraits like Otter’s drew inspiration from the crowd of
ambitious Americans who ventured thousands of miles into the Western frontier in search of
fortune, free land, and most important, the promise of a new beginning. The combination of the
weaving wagon train and an anonymous gravesite underscore the inherent danger settlers faced
as they made the trans-Mississippi journey.
Most artistic depictions of Western expansion promoted the idea that expansionism was
akin to progress. In Otter’s rendering, the sleek, powerful railway train leads the feeble wagon
train toward the golden glow of the Western horizon, underscoring the belief that America’s
future progress lay in the West. Otter’s work, like many other landscape portraits, were portrayed
as maps that visually drew the readers eye toward the Western side of canvas, reinforcing
Americans’ desire to extend America’s population beyond the confines of the original thirteen
states. This belief was part of a much larger folk movement taking hold across America, called
Manifest Destiny. Defined broadly, Manifest Destiny was both a belief and policy label that
advocated for American expansionism from sea to sea.

1
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Yet, Manifest Destiny was a contested concept among migrants, who carried with them
fundamentally different visions of western expansion and authority. In the minds of Southern
and Northern migrants, independence and dependence were fundamentally opposing strategies in
governance, and they sparred over how best to create a stable and well ordered western society.
While urban Whigs, most notably Yankee and New England migrants, heavily lobbied for state
sponsored public works projects and internal improvements, southern migrants envisioned
government in the West only as a means to protect their property, most notably slaves. This
fundamental conflict over governance divided migrants and foreshadowed the organization of
the Know Nothing party in the 1850’s.
I have organized the chapter according to the three significant phases of development in
St. Louis. The first phase, occurring just after statehood, saw a staggering economic and
population boom. During this period, migrants from both the North and the South flocked to
Missouri, imagining the St. Louis area as a landscape spiritually distinct from the North and
South and uniquely capable of producing a new society of Republican westerners. This belief
suggested that the fate of American progress-both culturally and economically- lay waiting in the
hands of St. Louis residents. St. Louisans heralded a new future for America, becoming the
model of Republican principles while devoid of political and moral corruption. While this myth
bound both groups together in a shared belief that Missouri held the key to America’s future
prosperity, differing views of governance split Missouri’s first generation of state builders.
During the second phase of development in St. Louis, the city became consumed with conflict as
resident coped with the tremendous growth of their city and clashed over conflicting
interpretations of republicanism. It is during this period that nativism in St. Louis took hold.
Yankee merchants, in part out of frustration over their political powerlessness, found a new
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political foe in the large influx of immigrants and sought any available avenues in which to
proscribe the growing class from political participation. The last phase began with a devastating
fire that destroyed a large portion of the city. The fire signaled a potential re-birth for the city,
allowing a new group to steer the rebuilding process, and in consequence, the political direction
of the city.
The Development of a Western Empire
The geographic location of St. Louis played a significant role in the initial attraction of
settlers to the area. St. Louis sits at the confluence of two major waterways in the Midwest-the
Mississippi and Missouri rivers. For centuries, this site made the region a strategic location for
trade and immigration. During the eighteenth century, Osage Indians and French fur traders
shared a fragile control over the region and took advantage of the free land and fertile soil to
create a strong output of wheat and fur trade. A floating population, however, hindered the
demographic and economic growth that their fellow Illinois and Louisiana neighbors
experienced during this period. 2 Unlike their territorial neighbors, the Osage and French
residents actively feared imperial encroachment from American settlers and created policies that
limited any external influences in the Missouri economy, including manufacturing and Eastern
banking. 3 The village by the river stood relatively untouched and autonomous, only engaging in
trade with north Louisiana traders. 4
Despite prescriptive territorial policies, the St. Louis region did not remain in isolation
for long. After a century of modest growth and a fluctuating population, the city received an
2
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unprecedented boom in permanent residents after the War of 1812 when American soldiers
stationed in the region decided to settle permanently. 5 During this period, land promoters
labeled the Missouri region as the “poor man’s country” and enticed these migrants to establish
roots in the region with cheap land and abundant natural resources. 6 By 1819, steamboat traffic
grew exponentially on the Mississippi River, allowing faster and more effective transportation
and trade between villages, and supplies and migrants poured into the region. The
Independence-- the region’s first commercial steamboat- ran up and down the Mississippi,
connecting the Louisiana traders with the St. Louis traders, effectively dissolving any previous
French trade policies. The city began its gradual move from a frontier post to a merchant capital
for the West.
The development of the city’s infrastructure did not gain momentum until after statehood.
Missouri’s quest for statehood sparked an intense debate over the extension of slavery into the
new territory. The Missouri Compromise temporarily appeased both sections by forcing a
balance of admitted free and slave states, and Missouri residents were charged with the task of
establishing a state that straddled the physical and ideological boundaries of the North and South.
Statehood sparked the necessary steps toward governmental organization and internal
improvements, the essential ingredients for the development of an urban metropolis in the West.
In the midst of Missouri statehood and municipal organization, a major ideological
phenomenon was taking root across America. Manifest destiny, the belief in continual expansion
ordained by God, became a political paradigm that enticed migrants to move west, looking for
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cheap land and new beginnings. 7 A central cornerstone of Manifest Destiny was Americans’
belief that imperialism was inherently linked to nationalism. Only through the courageous
pioneers who settled and domesticated the West could the American empire grow and progress.
In this vision, the growth of an American diaspora would eventually disperse republican ideals
across the continental frontier, spreading “liberty” and morality across the wild and savage West.
“The wild has been changed” one poet optimistically pronounced, “to a blooming garden and its
limits are expanding with the mighty genius of Liberty.” 8 The defense of American liberty, the
poet strongly implies, hinged upon territorial expansion. This belief defied class and sectional
loyalties, influencing both the elite and the working class across America’s landscape to uproot
and take a chance in the unknown frontier.
The concentration on Missouri as a focal point for Manifest Destiny occurred naturally.
According to many contemporary thinkers, St. Louis marked the gateway to the blossoming
West. 9 Travel literature exaggerated the region’s resources and implied migrants would be
immediately spoiled with riches and plentiful land, drawing eager settlers from across the
country specifically into the Missouri region. Advertisements, pamphlets, and narratives
circulated in Northern and Southern newspapers, enticing frontiersman with a fantastical image
of a western paradise ripe for settlement and plundering. Writers glowingly reporting that
Missouri “possessed all the right requirements of good climate, good soil and good health-with
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varied and beautiful scenery, and springs, and streams of pure water running rapidly over.” 10 It
was a valley of bountiful resources and unending agrarian potential. Literature romanticized the
city and shaded readers from the often brutal conditions that lay waiting for them in an
underdeveloped region. The waterways, abundant cheap land, and a strategic location made for
a perfect subject to set an American West mythology.
Theology played a significant role in the growing western lore. Advertisements often
compared St. Louis to the legendary Garden of Eden. 11 Writers often compared the biblical
region set between the union of the Tigres and Eurphrates Rivers, St. Louis was equally rich in
fertile land and ample water sources. In consequence, writers implied that the Missouri region
held similar spiritual powers that could heal the sick and generate an especially virtuous and
healthy society. One writer argued that Northeasterners “come from localities afflicted with
consumption, to a place where pulmonary disease is almost unknown, except in the cases cured
by its climate…” 12 Temptation, either through drinking or poor lifestyle, could be cured through
the mystical climate in Missouri.
The opportunity for new beginnings in an unsettled region struck a chord with many
Americans experiencing the growing pains of modernity. Writers followed their biblical
metaphors and lavish promises with short allusions to the drawbacks of their own climates. As
one pamphlet pointed out, “Come from the cold regions of all countries, where winter consumes
all the products of summer; come from crowded cities where the laboring man is poor, to a
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region where industry is sure of reward…” 13 The myth promised the best, and concealed the
worst of the region from readers.
Steamboats carried news of commercial trade and free land in the distant West. 14 This
news was particularly enticing for Southerners who were increasingly concerned with solidifying
slavery’s hold in the new territories. Northern merchant and bankers, however, found within the
growing market for food and farming a new opportunity to make money. In turn, writers
presented St. Louis as an unmarked and unclaimed region that lacked any identifiable cultural or
political character and therefore ripe for American settlement. 15 Consider the claim of one
anonymous essayist, writing in 1841:
The yells of fierce savages now faintly echo from beyond the waters of the Mississippi,
and the time is not far off when the last Indian will leave his bones to bleach on the rockbound coast of the Pacific. My hearers-this damsel Improvement, who drives head so on
the car of Time, is working astonishments in this little world of ours. 16
There was no room for Native Americans in this author’s vision of American expansionism.
Instead, their place in the Missouri region was easily white washed in favor of the Americans’
desire to expand.
The personification of St. Louis quickly manifested into a grand myth, which I term
Manifest Republicanism that blended Republican elements from the American Revolution that
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valued public virtue and autonomy with the expansionist principals of Manifest Destiny. 17
Manifest Republicanism was a broad, utopian vision that designated Missouri as America’s
destiny- both politically and morally.
This paradigm was heavily influenced by a belief in Missouri exceptionalism, a belief
that Missouri was unique, and generated a citizenry that held a distinct worldview. Unlike
Northern and Southerners preoccupied by the corruption and moral decay wearing down both
regions, Western residents had successfully escaped the trap and were morally superior.
Migrants who came to the region believed that their geographic position uniquely equipped them
for the task of developing and leading the new moral capital. They were the chosen few and
innately different from brethren left behind in their native region.
Manifest republicanism assumed there was a purpose-either nationalistic or religious- for
the various migrants who came to the region. 18 In the words of one travel writer, “St. Louis
enjoys the preeminent advantage of a position in the center of the great valley of the West…this
is a commanding point.” 19 The term commanding point is important to understanding the
underpinning ideology of the parable. Missouri would be the moral leader not only for future
settlements in the West, but for the already established North and South. This belief
presupposed that the problems afflicting the Southern and Eastern region, could be solved
through the strong moral leadership of St. Louis. A national purpose made the political stakes
much higher. Missouri state-building not only held immediate implications; settlers were setting
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an example for their country and any political failures could have national repercussions. This
would play a significant role later on as the Know Nothing Party developed a political platform.
In turn, Americans were captivated by fantasy of an awaiting Western paradise narrated
by travel literature, and St. Louis received a population boom between the 1830s and 1850s. 20
When migrants –from the North and South- settled in the city, they brought grand hopes for both
their own future, and their new setting. Collectively, they traveled to the new region, driven to
develop the area with a greater, nationalistic purpose in mind. St. Louis was the gateway, not
only to the riches and perils of the West, but for the future of American character and industry.
Despite a shared belief in Missouri exceptionalism however, differing motivations and
circumstances drove native-born migrants into the Missouri territory.
A majority of Southerners migrated to the Missouri territory to transplant southern
culture and slavery in the West. Most migrants from the South hailed from Kentucky, Virginia,
and Tennessee. 21 Most were poor, yeoman farmers enticed by the opportunity of cheap land in
which to create their own homesteads. Although Northerners feared the Missouri Compromise
would lead to the territory becoming a plantation society, most Southerners in the region could
not afford slaves.
A majority of Southerners settled on the periphery of St. Louis, preferring to focus on
homesteading and re-creating the agrarian dream that Thomas Jefferson had once planned for the
American West. This dream, underpinned by a pastoral ideology, assumed agriculture would
steer the economic system in the West. 22 Significantly, power and wealth were measured by
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land and not the complex forms of capital and stocks of the residents’ Northern neighbors. They
envisioned the next generation of Missourians perpetuating the republican farmer archetype,
selflessly toiling on his farm, and serving as a virtuous citizenry dedicated to an agrarian lifestyle
and landed aristocracy.
Northerner migrants, in contrast, alternatively planned to capitalize on the Western
markets, intent on creating a lucrative banking center in St. Louis. St. Louis, according to many
Northern merchants, was the next urban capital for America and required the guidance of
experienced businessman in order to reach its potential. They dreamed of the city becoming the
commercial epicenter of America, with steamships and railroads bringing merchant commodities
from the North and South, all converging in St. Louis.
Neither of these groups, however, incorporated the native population into their broad
vision for the future. The influx of population into the city erased most of the French-Indian
presence in the Missouri territory, effectively Americanizing the region. Reacting to the
changing atmosphere, French settlers labeled American migrants as “vampires,” slowly draining
the French-Indian culture out of the city in favor of an Anglo-Saxon demographic. After the
1820’s, the only French influence left in the city was in its name, and architectural relicts. 23
In sum, inhabitants from both sections migrated to the city with a shared imagination of
the West, drawn by the potential for St. Louis to grow into a commercial and cultural leader.
Although each group migrated to the region with very different reasons, they inevitably
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congregated within the city limits of St. Louis during the same period, charmed by the
mythological image of the city and the opportunities that lay waiting for them.
The Genesis of Nativism in St. Louis
In a letter to a close friend, St. Louis newcomer James Cowan of New England promised
that in St. Louis “there is every advantage here to bring a man of your turn and genius into
notice.” 24 Cowan assured his friend that education and good breeding would be met with
eagerness in the city. St. Louis, his description implied, was neither the frontier outpost or
Southern colony that many New Englanders and Yankees imagined. Instead, Cowan noted, the
western city was a perfect location for smart, adventurous New Englanders like himself to find
the independence and prosperity that had thus far escaped them in the crowded markets of the
North.
Cowan’s dream was the typical dream of many New England and Yankee migrants who
settled in the St. Louis region during the period of 1830 to 1850. Northern settlers were
primarily looking for a territory with greater social mobility than in New England. Social
mobility, including the freedom to participate in markets and expand their business quickly was
the cornerstone of their idea concept of independence.
Northern entrepreneurs almost all settled in the heart of the city, where they could live
within walking distance of their growing network of businesses, including grocery stores, banks
and grain merchants. Primarily middle to upper class, these men were Whigs who championed
healthy government funding in the public economy and state sponsored public improvements.
Their strong support for manufacturing and economic expansion formed their overarching vision
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of a bourgeoisie Western empire. This dream was not altogether out of reach. By the close of
the great northern migration in 1845, St. Louis was one of the primary banking and trading
centers in the country.
This bourgeoisie ideal of republicanism contrasted sharply with Southern settlers who
believed a family farm offered the key to virtue- a term used to mean honest, productive, and
civic-oriented. Southerners were neither interested nor committed to securing public-funded
education, major internal improvements or the investment of Eastern capital in the region. All of
these Yankee economic principles clashed fundamentally with their concept of independence.
Being independent to the average Southern settler meant being clear from debts, high taxes, and
being ability to rule their own households.
Although most of these political differences had been debated and discussed since the
nation’s founding, in St. Louis and other Western cities, these ideological differences consumed
city politics. Because of the nature of Manifest Destiny, settlers founded territories faster than a
government order could follow. Thus, settlers were forced to work together to create a state
government that satisfied the majority of migrants, which often led to tense debate over the
nature of government itself, much like St. Louisans faced during this period.
Southerners congregated in rural areas, with a small minority venturing within the city
limits. In many ways, Southerners were heard but not seen in St. Louis. Their agrarian
objectives were antithetical to the growing commercial market in the city, but they still held a
dominant political power in the state legislature. They lived and produced outside the
boundaries of the city, yet ruled over its direction from the capitol building.

27

For a short period, Northerners and Southerners developed the city in tenuous accord.
The primary focus for the first few decades after statehood was to create basic American
institutions that each group felt necessary for their individual interests, including a public school
system, a hospital, a telegraph office, a functioning port, and the development of more housing in
the city. Residents made small step toward improving the river’s port system, making access and
trade easier and more efficient, ensuring steamboat access that brought further opportunities for
migration and trade with outsiders.
As the state moved toward modernity, however, the ideological division between settlers
of St. Louis became apparent. Yankee merchants often complained of the inadequate streets,
poor health care, and the dangerous levee and port system on the Mississippi. This included a
dangerous harbor that frequently caught steamboats in a growing sand bar or choppy waters.
Each obstacle impeded the flow of traffic and cost the city a considerable amount of money
when a steamboat capsized. 25 The post-statehood improvements both groups supported did not
go far enough for merchants who depended and lived in the heart of the city, where many of the
city improvements were needed.
Fortunately for Southerners, for the first half of the nineteenth century, their group was
the majority of the voting population, granting them control over the political and economic
direction of the city. St. Louis, as well as Missouri as a whole, was primarily a Southern
occupied region masquerading as a new establishment. Southerners controlled the state
legislature, and therefore, the language and design of the state constitution and laws. 26 This
included Southerners attempts to block banking and real estate speculation, which they blamed
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for most the country’s financial panics. 27 By limiting frontier banks, Southerners hoped to keep
men of business and fraudulent investors from infecting the Missouri economy, thereby
inhibiting their own independence.
The Democrats, the party of Missouri Southerners, was commonly referred to as the
party of the “lower class,” and held political power in the region for decades. They found a
powerful leader in Thomas Hart Benton, a frontier politician who had charisma and deep
connections with rural Southerners. Benton spent the majority of his young adult life in North
Carolina before settling with his family in Tennessee and serving as a lawyer and lieutenant
colonel. After the War of 1812, Benton followed many pioneer’s West to Missouri in search of
new opportunities and quick fortune. He established himself as a newspaper editor for the
Missouri Enquirer, serving the political needs of Southerners before the Democratic Party
became a force in the state. He would eventually rise to become the most powerful politician in
Missouri history and the symbol of Democratic hegemony in the state. In many ways, Benton’s
character was reminiscent of Andrew Jackson, a frontier politician with a propensity to downplay
his intellectual gifts in favor of appealing to lower working class voters. 28
Tensions between rural Missourian and the merchant class surfaced as soon as the first
legislative program was enacted. Southerners passed sweeping economic policies that were
economically conservative in nature, and limited government aid for internal improvements.
Merchants pushed the legislature for a state-sponsored bank, standard state currency, and internal
improvements along the levee to make trade more efficient. Their pressure accomplished little,
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however. Southerners stood firm in their economic policy and St. Louis remained a fiscally
conservative city, much to the chagrin of Northerners looking to diversify the economy.
It was not until the late 1830’s that the Whig Party-comprised of Northern merchantsdeveloped a coalition in Missouri, but it did not alter the political landscape of the region. Whigs
never found a firm footing in the state and instead acted as a pressure group. Chiefly, Whigs
suffered politically from being tagged by Democrats as the party of the “genteel upper class.” 29
For most of Missouri’s history prior to the Civil War, the Democrats controlled power in the
state legislature.
Rise of the Immigrant Population
The rising percentage of foreign immigrants in St. Louis dramatically changed the
cultural and political landscape of the city. During the period between 1845 and 1854, the
United States received an influx of three million immigrants, with a significant portion traveling
on to St. Louis. The city’s population grew at a staggering rate during this stage, at certain
periods growing ten percent within days. 30 Thousands of immigrants reached the city on
steamboats every week, and their numbers soon eclipsed the population of native-born
Americans. The largest percentage of newcomers was German, with over thirty thousand in
Missouri, and six thousand living in St. Louis alone. 31 By 1850, more than half of the city
population was either German or Irish, with the latter making up fifteen percent of the
population. 32
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Immigrants, much like native-born inhabitants, found the opportunity to develop a new
urban city an attractive alternative to the already established cities of New York and Boston. St.
Louis offered the opportunity to carry on their cultural traditions and establish roots in an
emerging American city. Americanization was not part of their aspirations, and they clung to
Old World customs and traditions. Immigrants established their own parochial schools, welfare
agencies, and even their own militias. 33 They established an insular community within the city,
making social ties with native-born residents rare. 34
Very quickly, immigrants became immersed in the political culture of St. Louis. A
majority of them turned to the Democratic Party, in large part because Whigs in St. Louis already
held a strong nativist sentiment. 35 Unfortunately for Whigs, the growth of the immigrant vote
thwarted any political regime change in St. Louis. The Whig platform did not appeal to foreignborn voters, especially German and Irishmen leery of aristocratic elites, and party members soon
found themselves outnumbered. 36 In turn, Democrats maintained political power in St. Louis by
electing a string of city mayors, and their political dominance was seemingly endless.
Social conditions in St. Louis during this period deteriorated rapidly. Housing
development and social services did not keep pace with the massive influx of population. 37 St.
Louis streets were breeding grounds for tuberculosis, and its water sources produced numerous
cases of cholera. During especially deadly periods, the Missouri Republican reported the
weekly mortality rate from cholera alone at over a hundred. 38 Although Missourians had made
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great progress in internal improvements in prior decades, they simply could not keep pace with
the unprecedented population surge.
Nativists used these growing pains as an opportunity to attack the swelling immigrant
population. Yankee residents soon began to resent the old Frenchtown, an immigrant sanctuary
south of the city along the Mississippi River. Nativists renamed the district “Dutchtown” and
focused a significant portion of their political attacks on any social institutions that were foreign
in character, including the various pubs and brothels scattered throughout immigrant slums.
Intense rhetoric invariably led to random acts of violence and riots. During the late
1840’s in particular, St. Louis experienced a series of Nativist riots that continually grew more
heated and violent. On July 29, 1849, a cadre of fire companies engaged in a melee after a group
of Irishmen heckled the companies while they were fighting a blaze along the levee. Irishmen
fired bullets at the growing mob (by this time Nativists had learned of the melee and joined the
fireman) and the two groups battled along the docks of the Mississippi. After repeated attempts
to contain the violence, the police gained control, though most of the fighting had subsided
between both sides. 39 These engagements happened frequently and illustrate the growing
bitterness between the two groups as they fought to establish their positions within the city’s
social order.
At this crucial period, nativism became the primary political issue for northerners. The
Whigs experienced a schism within the party that allowed a small but powerful Nativist pressure
group to divide the party. 40 With the party’s economic plans for the city at a relative dead end,
and its member’s hopes for a political coup dashed with the emergence of the immigrant vote,
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nativism offered the only avenue for which Whigs to achieve political power. Neither policy nor
a strong leader, however, would push nativism to the forefront of Missouri politics. Instead, the
political growth in nativism would be aided by a random act of God, ironically aboard a
steamship.

The Great Fire of St. Louis: A New Beginning
In the late hours of May 17, 1849, fire bells awoke the sleeping city of St. Louis. Flames
peaked across the north end of the city near the docks of a group of steamboats. The Grey
Cloud, a steam boat docked on the Mississippi, set off a series of explosions and sparks that
ignited other steamboats and shipping to the right and left. The fire spread rapidly across the
levee, and then jumped toward the cheap, low income housing in the Fifth Ward. These
buildings were relicts of St. Louis’s frontier past- with wooden plank buildings crowded closely
together. The fire ripped through the old French wards with ease, and left blocks of thick ash
and rubble in its wake. Fireman battled the blaze with tenacity, hoping to contain it from the
northern block of the city where the majority of merchants and bankers lived. The winds carried
the blaze across the city, creeping dangerously toward the cathedral and courthouse, although
miraculously both received only minimal damage.
The Missouri Republican reported in the days after the fire the city suffered at least three
million dollars in property damage. 41 Millions of dollars of commodities lay floating in the
Mississippi River along with dozens of capsized steamboats. The loss of life, however, was
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never fully calculated. Newspapers estimated a minimum of a hundred but the final number was
never agreed upon.
The Great Fire proved to be the single greatest disaster to strike the young city. Three
quarters of St. Louis was leveled in hours, with the old French and immigrant districts receiving
the most damage. “Dutchtown,” reviled by Nativists, smoldered in ruins along with most of the
city. Immigrants, however, were not the only group that suffered mightily from the tragedy.
Merchants, unprepared for a fire left their life’s savings in vaults that were not fireproof.
Countless businessmen lost a majority of their savings and were forced to start over again.
William Greenleaf Eliot later stated, “The work of rebuilding began before the ruins were
cold…” 42 But who would steer the direction of constructing the city once again? After decades
of contentious and sometimes combative disagreements within the fractious city, starting the
process of development again could simply have meant a renewal of the sectional and ethnic
divisions that characterized the first half of the century. Northerners, however, had the upper
hand at this point. What they lacked in political power, they made up for in capital-an integral
ingredient for a city in ruins. Hours after the fire was extinguished the city’s districts were redrawn, and new ward supervisors were chosen in order to assess the damage and develop a
strategic plan for disaster relief. These appointed supervisors were business owners with
financial stakes in the reconstruction program. The Missouri Republican called for a meeting of
“businessmen of the city” to make the heavily burned areas the “handsomest part of the city.” 43
Merchants argued that if the city hoped to survive the disaster that accompanied the fire, and
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remain a financial capital for the West, immediate rebuilding had to occur. They commissioned
five hundred laborers to excavate the business district and clear the rubble. 44
Once the rubble was cleared, business leaders across St. Louis organized and designed a
re-building plan for the city. In a shrewd move, merchants took control of the plan and redefined
the city. This included immediate improvement of the roads, rebuilding the destroyed port
system, and designing safer building structures in both the residential areas and the financial
district. Many of these improvements were not only meant to be practical, but to “beautify” the
city and make it less of a pioneer boomtown. After years of following the conservative
Democratic political agenda, northern Whigs dreams of extensive internal improvements seemed
to be within reach again.
The new St. Louis, however, only benefited a select few in the city, namely the merchant
class. Re-districting and “improved” housing pushed immigrants out of the affluent northern
block of the city and into the older parts of the city that were left standing, carefully out of the
purview of the elite whites. 45 Housing costs soared during this period, with one resident glumly
reporting that the new St. Louis came with exorbitantly high housing costs. The group’s city
plan, in consequence, demonstrated gentrification in its early form in urban America.
This development plan went beyond the physical re-building process of the city.
Merchants made the case to the public that a new economic system was needed in order to solve
the crises. The conservative, insular approach to Missouri government steadfastly pursued by
Democrats was quickly disregarded as businessmen fought aggressively for eastern capital to
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recover lost savings. Missourians received insurance payouts from Northern banks that
inevitably lead to St. Louis’s reputation as an Eastern city in the West. 46
As early as 1851, Whig participation in city politics flourished, with weekly meetings
across the city. 47 Whigs took on a more vocal role in advocating for more state support for
public institutions, including extending the public health care system, higher education, and even
more opportunities for arts and culture in the region. This included the public school system,
with popular Whig leaders Wayman Crow and William Eliot assuming control over the city’s
school system and advocating for further state support for public education. 48
In an edition of first anniversary of the fire, the Missouri Republican glowingly reported
of the rebuilding process:
It may be assumed, therefore, that the great loss by the fire of the 17th of May has been,
within a year after its occurrence, almost entirely repaired. It has been altogether so, if
we take into consideration the greatly improved and costly character of the buildings
which have been erected, the enhanced rents which the owners are receiving, the
increased facilities for business, and the security from fire which widened streets and
alleys unquestionably afford. 49
Like countless other editorials, the Republic editor of the Whig organ offered glowing reports
about the new housing developments and city plans. Although many writers predicated many of
their reports with a solemn acknowledgement of the tragic death toll, they commonly spoke of
the fire as a sacrifice that was needed in order to build a stronger, more modern city for residents.
46
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Newspapers prophesized St. Louis would “rise, phoenix-like, from her ashes.” 50 Editors
carefully cultivated a celebratory lore surrounding the tragedy that portrayed the rebuilding a
natural course in the progress of the city.
Historian Adam Arenson has argued that the Great Fire “occurred at the start of a new
era” in St. Louis’s history. 51 His statement, however, does not give the Great Fire enough
historical credit. The great fire not only marked the beginning a new phase of change in St.
Louis, it was the catalyst for change. The destruction of the old, French wards provoked
Yankees to re-model the city, both architecturally and economically, into a Northern model of
bourgeois supremacy.
Conclusion
At the close of the first half of the nineteenth century, the city of St. Louis had gone
through immense change and growth. Like many urban areas during this time, St. Louis was
confronting the growing pains that accompany modernity. As newcomers- Northerners,
Southerners and immigrants- settled had developed the city; new loyalties divided the political
landscape and quickly marked the region as polarized. The Know Nothings were the
beneficiaries of these events, bred from decades of hostility toward Democratic hegemony and
foreign political influence. In the following few years, nativism became a dominant ideology for
Northerners as they navigated the political landscape of St. Louis and sought to establish their
political dominance.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RISE OF THE KNOW NOTHING PARTY IN ST. LOUIS

On a mid- November evening in 1850, Democratic Senator Thomas Hart Benton of
Missouri rose to address an audience of eight hundred of St. Louis’ wealthiest and economically
powerful citizens at the Mercantile Library. 1 It was a curious setting for Benton. The Mercantile
Library was founded by city merchants and Whig stalwarts, Benton’s political enemies for much
of his long political career. Benton, however, chose the setting in a clever act of politicking,
hoping his speech would serve as a symbolic bridge over the ideological differences between the
two parties.
At the moment of his speech, Benton was desperately fighting to salvage what remained
of his reputation and career in Missouri. Months earlier the senator had lost his senatorial
campaign in a bitter contest that revealed the growing dissatisfaction among Missourians over
the divisive issues of slavery and federal funding. These issues, combined with the national
debate over the Compromise of 1850, had placed Benton in a precarious position. As a
prominent opponent of slavery extension in a state driven by proslavery Democrats, Benton
understood his political viability rested upon an alliance with his former political foes, the
Whigs, in order to gain lost support within his own fractured party. 2 In his new political
strategy, Benton characterized himself as the people’s senator, a servant wholly devoted to the
future growth of St. Louis.
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The speech, aptly titled, “The Progress of the Age,” attempted to mend broken
relationships severed after the compromise by refocusing the attention of Missourians on the
promise of momentous economic and cultural growth of St. Louis in the coming years. 3 “The
world” Benton remarked “was never so enlightened…never before so humane, social, and
benevolent.” Missourians, he implored, had a divine purpose for their particular region,
invoking the predominate belief in Missouri exceptionalism that initially motivated migrants to
the state. “This is to be the theatre of the St. Louis merchant-a city such as this will be, not only
fifty, but five hundred, and thousands of years hence-an American territory which can neither be
diminished nor divided.” 4 Benton’s language straddled the lines between optimism and naiveté;
the speech assumed Missourians could easily move away from the partisan bickering and unite
under the auspices of Missouri progress. Unfortunately for Benton, he gravely underestimated
the bitter class divisions in the region, particularly in St. Louis. For Missourians across the
political spectrum, progress was a highly divisive term that carried with it years of simmering
divisions between Democrats and Whigs who had fought a lengthy political battle over the
direction of city development. In consequence, Benton represented the old order, out of touch
with desires of Missouri voters and tainted by a seemingly inadequate national legislature. 5
Just a few months after Benton’s Mercantile speech, St. Louis Mayor and rising Whig
star Luther M. Kennett contributed a written declaration of the state of the city in a new
opposition newspaper, The St. Louis Intelligencer. Kennett was relatively new to the political
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scene and rose quickly, perhaps aided in large part because he did not suffer from political
baggage unlike Benton.
Kennett proclaimed: “Let us hope that moral and intellectual improvement will keep pace
with the increase of wealth and luxury, and that our citizens may be prepared by education and
habit to be worthy of the future if they so resolve, the brilliant future that is in reserve for them.” 6
The spoils of intellectual and material pursuits, however, could only be achieved through an
unprecedented surge in public improvements throughout the city. Only through a much more
aggressive economic policy, Kennett argued, would Missourians live to see the “‘greatest good
for the greatest number’-and the early and timely preparation of St. Louis for its ‘manifest
destiny,’ that of being at no distant period the Queen City of the Great Central Valley of the
American Republic, and in time the largest inland town on the face of the Globe.” 7 Progress, in
Kennett’s view, could only be obtained through a strict adherence to a radical Whig economic
policy that advocate a stronger bond between government and business.
Kennett’s message stood as a testament to Missouri’s new political environment. The
great fire, coupled with the politically jarring Compromise of 1850, dramatically altered the
political landscape and garnered the Whigs and the merchant class more political power. The
growing distinctiveness of an elite, radical sect of the Whig party helped reinforce the idea of
progressive economic reform that had become an overruling principle in antebellum Missouri.
Both Benton and Kennett stood at the confluence of these changes, maneuvering and adapting
their political positions to keep pace with them. Their dueling visions foreshadowed what would
become one of the most vital elections in St. Louis history, marking an important turning point in
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the relationship of the state government and its citizens, and propelling an embryonic Know
Nothing movement into a significant position of power in Missouri politics.
The Know Nothing party, a hybrid of disillusioned Whigs and Democrats, became the
major oppositional party in Missouri. It enlisted Luther Kennett as its chief spokesman.
Kennett’s followers labeled their candidate as the future of economic prosperity for the city with
the political slogan “Pure Americanism.” Kennett and his followers came to define this
paradigm as an alternative form of republicanism that sought to adopt a new city order,
privileging an elite group of Missourians with a series of massive internal improvements and
state subsidies for merchants. The rise of the Know Nothings and their new, distinct republican
ideology can be viewed through three significant events that happened in quick succession.
During the late months of 1850, the Compromise of 1850 provoked intense political debate and
chaos among the political parties in Missouri, which shifted political loyalties and partisanship in
the region. During the same period a small group of wealthy merchants established the St. Louis
Intelligencer, a voice for the more virulent faction of Whigs that eventually evolved into the
Know Nothing Party. This paper grew into the first and only political organ for the Know
Nothings, creating a distinct identity and voice for the new group. Finally, the congressional
election of 1854 between Benton and Kennett gave the embryonic party an opportunity to test its
new political platform and establish it summarily distinct from their mother party, the Whigs.
These three events allowed the group in two short years to develop into an organized political
party and consequently win its first statewide election.
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The Compromise of 1850: The Birth of a New Political Landscape
On February 5, 1850, Kentucky Senator Henry Clay approached the podium to fight
aggressively for a sectional compromise and stave off a potential secession crisis throughout the
Southern states. The persistent question of extending slavery into new territories routinely
created political angst amongst Northern and Southern sections, but when California applied for
admission to the Union, the Whigs and Democrats were quickly consumed in a contentious fight
over the extension of slavery. Clay attempted to reconcile these differences with a series of five
resolutions, known as the Compromise of 1850. Clay’s plan asked both sections to cede political
ground, including the fugitive slave clause for Northerners, while the South would relinquish
both the domestic slave trade in Washington, D.C., and the extension of slavery in California.
Benton’s opposition to the compromise was complex to say the least. A Unionist at
heart, Benton found that the tenuous compromise on slavery extension did little to promote
nationalism and only prolonged a conflict between the two sections. Remarking later on the
compromise, he stated: “there has been no moment in the progress of this business in which there
was not a majority of Senators in favor of the general object of each measure of this bill.” 8
Although Benton was a fervent Democrat and opposed the fundamental principles of Whiggery,
he formed a tacit alliance with the party against the Compromise in order to stop what he
considered a hapless debate over slavery extension that would only prolong a rift between
sections. Instead, Benton energetically pushed Congress for funding of a grand railroad line that
would connect the North, South and West from a hub station in St. Louis. A railroad, he hoped,
would divert attention away from slavery and instead serve as the chain to bind the three regions
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together and promote western expansion. 9 Ever the savvy politician, Benton competed with the
great compromisers for national attention, and aggressively fought for the transnational railroad
to start in St. Louis that would allow Missourians to reap the immense economic rewards a
railroad could bring. Henry Clay, however, quickly shot down funding for a transnational
railroad under the terms of the compromise, and Missourians lost key support in bringing the
railroad to St. Louis.
Although Benton lost the railroad proposal, he did not quietly fade into the background
during the compromise debates. On the floor of Congress, he passionately argued against the
compromise, and sought every legislative avenue in which to stall a vote, including amendments
and procedural votes. 10 In response to Benton’s parliamentary diversionary tactics, Vice
President Millard Fillmore ruled Benton out of order. As Benton refused to stand down, a
tenacious Mississippi Senator Henry S. Foote brandished a gun and threatened him on the Senate
floor. 11 The three parties were separated and their tempers eventually cooled, but Benton
continued his political crusade against the compromise, even after its eventual passage. 12 In the
thick of a heated congressional race two years later, Benton bitterly recounted his opposition: “I
have but one view of it from the beginning, and that one I freely communicated to my intimate
friends-it was total condemnation of the whole scheme! I held but one conduct towards it from
the beginning, and that was to stand off and let it alone. It was a union upon the spoils principle
which I abhor and detest, and would never go into such a combination…” 13 His animosity was
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so virulent, their national newspapers frequently published his adversarial speeches on the front
page, and his political persona generated several popular national political cartoons. 14 Benton’s
opposition amounted to naught, and the compromise was passed due to the careful maneuvering
and negotiation of Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois. 15 Douglas succeeded in the short term
and forestalled an impending civil war, but the Compromise did not reconcile the fundamental
difference of opinion among sections over the place of slavery in America.
As Northerners and Southerners grappled with the Compromise’s political implications,
Benton bitterly returned to Missouri under intense political scrutiny. 16 Fiery political matter had
already begun to consume Missouri party politics, with angry op-ed pieces featured prominently
in Missouri newspapers. Historian Michael Holt has argued that the question of slavery
extension was potentially lethal for national political parties; state parties “made slavery
extension another source of interparty combat between them and thereby retained the loyalty of
most of their voters.” 17 In Missouri politics, however, the compromise served as a political
hurricane, throwing loyalties and partisanship into a tailspin and creating deep schisms among
rank and file voters in each party. Benton inadvertently became a political compass in which
Missourians based their political partisan loyalties on their party’s support for the senator.
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The Missouri Democrats quickly dissolved into two warring factions: pro-Bentonites and
anti-Bentonites. Anti-Bentonites found Benton’s condemnation of the slave power and the
fugitive slave clause antithetical to the proslavery heritage in Missouri. “He has been weighed in
the balance and found wanting… we say resign! Resign! And let some man be appointed, who
will more correctly represent the wishes of the people of the State in Congress.” 18
In the case of pro-Bentonite Democrats, their loyalty was less to Benton as an individual
than to the general principle he promoted: Unionism. Unionists accused Anti-Benton Democrats
of being “Calhoun politicians.” These “petty politicians of the State,” they argued, “are not now,
and never have been his friends…and the people, heretofore, have had discernment enough not
to trust their profession of principles.” 19 Several pro-Bentonites authored public
pronouncements in support of Benton, signed simply “One of the Old Guard,” 20 a symbolic show
of support for Benton and the traditional values of compromise. The opposition, Benton
supporters argued, was under the spell of a group of “mischievous” partisans designing to
“inflame the passions of those who are arraying themselves under their respective banners.” The
“banners” described by the contributor served as a convenient metaphor for sectional identity, a
barrier Unionist found proscriptive, prohibiting a national identity to take root. “THE PEOPLE”
the contributor passionately implored, “should act, and repress and repudiate the efforts of these
incendiaries to bring about a dissolution of this glorious union. 21
Fearful of these Democratic divisions, Benton balked at the lack of harmony in the state,
professing the city was: “Just as divided as ever, so far as the anti-Benton leaders are concerned,
with the advantage of putting them in the coach box, whip and reins in hand; worse than ever on
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the part of democracy, who are now enacting the part of the anvil under the hammer, receiving
all the hard knocks and returning none.” 22 Benton, in consequence, was left adrift in a sea of
opposing Democratic loyalties, with only a minority of pro-Bentonites for support.
As the Whigs witnessed the disintegration of their political foes, it seemed they were in
the best political position they had been in Missouri politics thus far. The great fire had given
them a political resurgence and allowed them the opportunity to reassemble the City Council
with Whig stalwarts, successfully mitigating much of the Democratic party’s influence in St.
Louis. The Democrats were otherwise succumbing to internal divisions with Benton as their
leader. But the Compromise’s destructive trend did not spare Missouri Whigs, instead exposing
significant ideological disagreements within the party.
Much like the Democrats, the Whigs split in support of Benton. Pro-Benton Whigs found
his support of the railroad extension a step toward even more national funding for St. Louis
internal improvements and western expansion itself. The Missouri Republican editor published
short, direct proclamations of support for the senator almost daily. 23 The paper’s support of
Benton, however, was tenuous. Benton was at that time the only politician actively fighting for
the railroad, an economic incentive that would directly benefit their voters. Naturally, the editors
found a convenient political alliance with him, but their support hinged upon securing the
transnational railroad hub in St. Louis. 24 The Missouri Republican fiercely defended Benton
against both Democrat and fellow Whig attacks, characterizing him as an honest politician and
22

Ibid, May 23, 1852.
The Missouri Republican’s political affiliation requires particular clarification. From the Jacksonian Era to the
mid-1850’s, the paper supported the Whigs until the party’s political disintegration. From 1856 onward, the paper
endorsed the Democrats. See, Walter Barlow Steven’s 100 Years of the St. Louis Republic (St. Louis: St. Louis
Republic, 1908), 9-13.
24
Later, when it became clear the railroad would not materialize, they made a dramatic turnabout and returned to
characterizing Benton as the face of Democratic tyranny. For the present, however, the majority of Whigs
steadfastly supported Benton during the brunt of the political firestorm.
23

46

an “unflinching friend of the Missouri Democracy” 25 Any opposition to Benton, the editor
implied, was tantamount to an assault on the tranquility of the Union itself. 26 Conservative
Whigs implored the party to draw a firm line in its support Benton, further solidifying a divide
between the conservative and radical fringes. 27
As the majority of Whigs placed their political bets with Benton, a small, radical faction
of the party grew increasingly frustrated by its party’s alliance with the Democratic leader. AntiBentonite Whigs characterized Benton as the epitome of political impotence in the national
legislature. The group believed its party’s support of him was misguided and reckless. One
Whig newspaper remarked of Benton’s railroad support:
What is this, ye hypocrites, but good, old…solid and sterling Whig doctrine?...the
principles you have fought against and kept down by baseborn and low-flung
calumniation…? What has become of the doctrine that Congress had no power to make
internal improvements? Is not all Missouri Locofocodom on the tiptoe of anxiety to
show how devout they are in spirit to make a railroad a mile wide and 2,500 miles in
length, at the cost of probably 200 millions of dollars? And is not every foot of this road
to be made by Congress? 28
The St. Louis Intelligencer warned its readers their support could lead the Northern press to favor
Benton as a presidential candidate, hurting their own party’s chances. 29 Furthermore, any crossparty alliance with Benton, anti-Bentonites argued, degraded their own party’s values, and hurt
their national party’s chances at the presidency. Anti-Bentonites questioned the legitimacy of
Benton’s support, and found his weakened support among his own party an opportunity to take
down the powerful Democratic senator.
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Upon closer examination, however, anti-Benton frustrations were merely a veneer for a
much deeper schism between conservative and radical Whig members over the future of the
Whig platform in the city. The successful string of housing reforms that accompanied the Great
Fire prompted a new generation of Whigs to voice a decidedly more activist political ideology
than the Whigs had traditionally pursued. This new ideology included, broad support of state
sponsored reform, including public education, banking laws, and health care. Radicals wanted to
fundamentally change the scope and intent of government into a more energetic and visible body
in the city’s institutions.
Furthermore, the Whig Party in Missouri traditionally operated as a pressure group, rarely
crossing the boundary from political advocate to aggressive partisan. Active campaigning
meant for many finally establishing a formal Whig ticket for each St. Louis election, an act that
had long been ignored by Whigs for fear of Democratic retribution. 30 The Whigs focused
primarily on the city alderman positions, which had traditionally been appointed or elected by
Democrats. After the Great Fire, however, the positions were hastily filled by Whig
representatives, and they played a profound role in steering the new, progressive direction of the
city during the first few years of the 1850s. These men came from the radical wing of the Whig
party, and included future political stars of the Know Nothing Party, including: Luther Kennett,
Wayman Crow, and George Budd. 31
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The more radical wing of the Whigs found a new political leader in Luther Kennett, a
wealthy merchant and elder statesman in the region. Kennett had been a consistent fixture in the
St. Louis political scene for the past few decades, but the great fire elevated him, like many
wealthy Whigs, into an alderman position. 32 He also remained one of the most enigmatic and
politically pliable candidates to run for office in antebellum Missouri. At various points, Kennett
could be virulently nativist and anti-Catholic, before quickly pandering with great success to
immigrants for political support. 33 In political circles, this flexibility made him an ideal political
candidate for the radical sect, who had not yet formed a solidified membership or campaign
platform.
In the fall of 1850, Kennett campaigned for and won the mayoral seat in St. Louis, further
solidifying the change in course for the Whigs. He moved into the leading role of the radical
Whigs with ease, enacting a broad-sweeping plan of internal improvements that had been, for
most of the Whigs short life span in the city, an unattainable dream. Equipped with the support
of his fellow alderman and political partners, Kennett laid out an ambitious proposal for the city
in the new year, including: authorizing the city to borrow money from the state, improvements to
the harbor, expanding the local hospital, and cosmetic improvements to the parade ground, and
city square. 34 In response to heavy Democratic criticism, Kennett remarked, “But does not the
rapid increase of our city in wealth and population justify us in making preparation for its future
growth as well our own immediate comfort?” 35 Not only was an aggressive economic policy
necessary, Kennett declared, it was vital to the progress of the city.
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A Printers Voice: The St. Louis Intelligencer and the Birth of the Know Nothings
As the Missouri state party system rapidly disintegrated under the weight of the
Compromise of 1850, a small group of wealthy St. Louis merchants were busy planning a game
changing political maneuver of their own. On January 1, 1850, George Budd, an entrepreneur
with seemingly endless business ties among the city elite, produced the inaugural edition of the
St. Louis Intelligencer. The paper proved to be an instant sensation in St. Louis, with
advertisements and page counts of the periodical growing considerably each day. 36 Although
most political movements and parties in American culture maintained a partisan paper by this
point, the Intelligencer holds the legacy of helping the Know Nothing’s organize and develop a
rhetorical platform through its pages. 37 The paper gave a voice to a discontented minority of
Whigs who no longer felt wholly loyal to their mother party.
“A public journal,” editor J.B. Crockette proclaimed in the inaugural issue, “if conducted
with fairness and candor, with dignity and discretion-if it is allowed to become the instrument of
no faction, nor the vehicle of private malice if it advocates only what is pure in morals” would
elevate the morals of its readers through intellectual enlightenment and personal fulfillment. The
Intelligencer, Crockette declared, would avoid the travails of partisanship and political
dishonesty of other pressmen and act as a moral compass for readers, guiding their head and
hearts through honest, and introspective forecasts. Crockette concluded the introductory piece
with a cautionary note to Whig readers: “Our prospectus has already announced that the
Intelligencer will advocate ‘the noble conservative principles which have heretofore
36
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characterized the Whig party,’ This pledge will be faithfully redeemed, and so long as the
administration of General Taylor continues as faithfully as it has hitherto done to uphold those
principles, it will receive the cordial and hearty support of this journal.” 38 The Intelligencer,
Crockett implied, did not work for the Whigs, it was purely a political watchdog. This
significant delineation foreshadowed the newspaper’s eventual break from the Whig party in
favor of the growing Nativist movement.
In the first few months, Crockette aimed toward arousing anti-party sentiment among
readers. He often lamented his disgust at the national political scene and the grandstanding of
national legislators. 39 News columns and lengthy op-ed pieces presented endless coverage of
partisan bickering and the lack of progress by Congress to reconcile its fundamental differences
on slavery. One particular editorial piece observed:
It is mortifying to witness so much wrangling in our National Legislature. Most of the
time of Congress is occupied by subjects of no practical importance; much time is wasted
in discussing abstractions, and a large portion of it is devoted to speeches for home
consumption. 40
Crockette further bemoaned the state of Congress, griping: “their debates cost their country
heavily, and seriously retard the public and private legislation of Congress.” 41 Magnifying the
inadequacies of the Whigs and Democrats seemed to prove an effective strategy, as op-eds
multiplied in the following months, growing increasingly sensational in nature. 42
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Crockette’s literary scheme of hortatory and incendiary rhetoric chartered a new course in
Missouri newspaper culture. 43 Prior to the Intelligencer, partisan papers in Missouri were
surprisingly restrained in their language and reporting to the public. 44 Crockette, however, used
stinging and hyperbolic commentary generously to mobilize Whigs, especially against the state
legislature they found stifling to business interests. 45 Extreme language and ad hominem attacks
filled its pages, and in every daily issue, the editor dutifully offered a front-page editorial brashly
attacking the Democrats and the state legislature (filled with both Democrats and Whigs). Many
of Crockette’s opinion pieces attacked the Democrats for their self-interest, or indifference to the
issues plaguing the merchant class, particularly vagrancy laws and usury taxes.
Democrats, of course, received a generous amount of criticism, including Governor
Austin Augustus King and Senator Benton, the most visible faces of the party at the time. The
editor implored King and his supporters to retire in shame, acerbically declaring:
WE think that his excellency should be satisfied by this time, that he is held in the most
fotid[sic] contempt by the democracy of the state. Two thirds of the press that supported
him for governor has since denounced him for his unwarrantable somerset[sic] last
summer, and will hold no fellowship with him. His name is a slur upon the party. The
few friends who still cling to him instead of letting him die his political death as softly
and easily as the case will permit, are constantly and most cruelly holding him up as a
pink of consistency, and a criterion of honest politicians! 46
The editor ended his stinging diatribe with a final parting shot at King’s Democratic and Whig
supporters, “We conceive it to be most cruel in these men to be continually bringing this man
before the public. As his friends they should for the sake of decency let him alone- for like a
43
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mass of filth and corruption, the more he is stirred the worst he stinks…” 47 Crockette’s editorial
supported a journalistic tactic described by historian Jeffrey Pasley as “the politics of
exclusion.” 48 Editors routinely produced scathing character profiles that: “ejected opponents
from the public sphere by re-embodying them in guises” that highlighted their personal
shortcomings. 49 Crockette carefully stripped away his adversary’s airs of gentility and honor,
creating demeaning caricatures that entertained his readers and discredited his opposition.
Benton faced a gauntlet of attacks, including editorials that described the ex-senator as
corrupt and a “despot.” 50 When Benton lost his 1850 re-election campaign, the Intelligencer
cuttingly remarked: “The last mail steamer brought to us the welcome news of the political
regeneration of Missouri-the defeat and final overthrow of the unscrupulous, vain and egotistical
pretender, Benton” 51 The citizens of “dear old Missouri” had finally rid themselves of “one who
has for nearly thirty years misrepresented her true interest in the Senate of the United States.” 52
Crockette often portrayed local elections as impending crises for democracy. He pleaded
with readers to stand up against the Legislature at the polls, or else “despotism” 53 could spread
throughout the state and spoil democracy within it. By constructing a fictional reality for
readers, Crockette implied frequently that the state of democracy could easily succumb to
tyranny without an adequate republican watchdog. Crockette, of course, assumed his editorials
should rightfully assume that role.
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Within this intense partisan climate, the editors of both Whig periodicals the Intelligencer
and Missouri Republican held somewhat parallel partisan views and publicly maintained an
amicable relationship. The growing popularity of the Intelligencer, however, soon began to
make the Republican’s editor anxious, leading to a rivalry highlighted in the pages of both
periodicals. Upon news of the publication of the Intelligencer, the Missouri Republican
proclaimed:
We learn from the New Era of last evening that this new Whig paper will appear about
the 7th inst. Its institution is to run itself against the republican, but we are apprehensive
that it will miss the mark, in as much as we believe that none of contemporaries have ever
been able to find out the exact position of the enterprising journal. The intelligencer,
however, is not only full of energy, but has ‘a pock full of rocks’ and is determined to
strive for a position that the Republican has not yet attained. 54
The Intelligencer editor publicly responded to the announcement with a front page editorial:
Towards our brethren of the press we cherish no feelings but those of unfeigned good
will, and we are resolved that in our intercourse with them our conduct shall be marked
only by courtesy and due respect. If this felling is met in a proper spirit, as we have no
reason to doubt it will be, we shall get on most pleasantly with all our neighbors. 55
As the printed exchanges imply, both editors at least publicly tried to quell any competition
among the Whig papers. However, as Crockette became comfortable in his role as a deliberate
partisan, he expected the editor of the Republican to mimic his literary style with theatrical
commentary in order to mobilize the more conservative wing of the Whigs. When the legislature
passed a higher tax on imported goods, merchants looked toward each paper for guidance, and an
effective political strategy to fight against the tax. The Republican implored readers to wait
patiently for a possible reversal by the court. The Intelligencer, however, found considerable
fault with the cautionary strategy, and caustically shot back: “The Republican However, advises
them to be exceedingly discreet and temperate, for fear that they may arouse undue prejudices
54
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against them.” 56 Crockette’s attack illustrates the deeper changes between the old and new
norms of print culture. While he naturally assumed the role as partisan editor and proudly
manipulated readers emotions for political purposes, the Republican’s editor attempted to
maintain an air of objectivity and stay above the fray of partisan attacks.
The Intelligencer did not make the fateful break with Whig party until the second year of
operations, when the state Legislature- a mixture of Whigs and Democrats- began to pass taxes
unfavorable for the merchant class. Most of these measures took the form of usury laws that
curtailed the rate of interest a merchant or banker could charge a borrower to six percent. 57
Radical Whigs beseeched the state Legislature to forego a cap, but were ultimately unsuccessful
in forestalling a vote in favor of the statutes. 58 The Intelligencer desperately urged the editor of
the Missouri Republican to join its cause and help mobilize fellow Whigs against the legislation.
If conservative Whigs did not adopt the tax reform issue as a central issue in the Whig platform,
the editor pled, the legislature would begin attacking all Whigs, not just the privileged elite. “The
merchants are the victims now; but a year or two hence it may be the mechanic, the
schoolmaster, the minister, or the farmer. If it should be focused necessary to increase the
revenue demagogues will be afraid to advocate an open, undisguised directed property tax but
they will be found taxing vocations and making honest men pay for the privilege of following an
honest calling.” 59
The Missouri Republican largely ignored the desperate pleas of Crockette as the
ideological distance between the two wings of the Whig party grew wider. He found
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considerable fault with the direction he perceived the party taking, starting with the
conservatives’ apathy toward the Legislature’s tax policies. The lack of initiative by the
Republican and its conservative readers to form an organized campaign against the Legislature
frustrated Crockette. He unleashed a series of angry, front-page essays that characterized the
conservative wing of the party as “old fashioned,” 60 and “despondent.” 61 “We are mortified” the
editor heatedly wrote, “to see the indifference which is manifested toward these great enterprises.
But the people of St. Louis will soon be taught a lesson which they will not soon forget.” 62
Taking yet another opportunity to illustrate an impending political crisis, the editor warned his
readers: “If these enterprises fail now, it will depreciate the reputation and prospects of this city
throughout the union. It will not only prove that we are wholly devoid of enterprise and public
spirit, but that we are deficient in a city, and are blind to the teachings of experience.” 63 The
Whigs, Crockette claimed, lacked the fighting spirit necessary to take the political reigns from
the Democrats and fulfill Missouri’s destiny as the preeminent American city. After dissolving
their political relationship with the Whigs, Budd and Crockette focused on establishing a distinct
political identity for their wayward group. The fateful decision to join the growing Nativist
movement can be explained in two ways: ideological agreement and opportunity.
While the Know Nothing movement was always an elitist undertaking in St. Louis- its
founding members were affluent merchants supported by a social network of likeminded wealthy
businessmen- popular rhetoric published in the pages of the Intelligencer identified the party as
an early form of progressive populism, with supporters seeking “greater opportunity because
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they see society as tilted out of balance.” 64 “In our opinion” Crockette protested, “the whole
system is anti-republican, arbitrary, tyrannical, liable to the grossest abuses, and dangerous in the
extreme. It is incompatible with that republican equality and that sacred regard for the rights of
minorities which are the boasts of all American citizens.” 65 These exaggerated notions of
Democratic tyranny and of lackadaisical conservative Whigs forced radicals to look outside the
periphery of their traditional party roles and find a new label in which to differentiate
themselves. Crockette and Budd branded this new opposition party as the only refuge for
democratically conscious men in the city.
The national Know Nothing Party, already underfoot in various cities across the country
by this point, began to utilize rhetoric similar to Crockette’s editorials. Historians have long
debated the role of populism, either progressive or reactionary, in the Nativist movement, and
whether it was merely a passing trend. 66 Yet, populist currents ran rampantly throughout Know
Nothing rhetoric, both in the North and South, and served as a framework in which the group
expressed its displeasure with the political status quo. Thus, radical Whigs did not view the
Know Nothings as a drastic or incongruent political ideology from the one they were already
expressing in print.
Furthermore, radical Whigs joined the Know Nothings in a clever act of political
opportunism. 67 By 1852, Know Nothing lodges were already slowly spreading across the city
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through the initiative of ex-Native American party men. 68 These lodges caught the attention of
newspaper editors, who cryptically referenced the secret meetings in their columns. 69 The
Intelligencer revealed its affinity for the growing opposition party, describing the meetings as an
amalgamation of “the enlightened and patriotic of both parties.” 70 Many of the lodges were
centered squarely in the financial district where merchants lived and worked, a significant
incentive.

Election of 1854: “Pure Americanism” and the Rise of the Know Nothing Party
In the summer of 1854, the newly formed Know Nothing Party launched its first
congressional campaign in an election that pitted old foes Kennett and Benton against each other
once again. “Justice to the West!” 71 a jubilant newspaper headline screamed to readers on
August 7, 1854. Justice, according to the Republican’s estimate, was nothing short of a
sweeping Know Nothing victory. Claiming success prematurely, the editor excitedly
proclaimed: “Mr. Kennett will be heard and justice will be done in the West.” 72 The election
served as a watershed moment for the city. Natives pushed aside the politically powerful
Democrats and transitioned Missouri toward an economically progressive direction. Now armed
with a strong political voice in Kennett, an identity courtesy of Crockette’s editorials, the Know
Overdyke’s The Know Nothing Party in the South and Jean Baker’s Ambivalent Americans: The Know Nothing
Party in Maryland. Furthermore, John Merring similarly argued this point in his work, The Whig Party in Missouri
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Nothings were finally able to campaign on a platform expressing their distinct vision for the city;
a grand plan that personified their dream of a bourgeois empire, complete with new city roads, a
state bank, and the adoption of state financial regulations that suited “their people.” 73
In the 1854 election, the newly branded Know Nothings packaged a form of nationalism
that championed a significant growth in state spending and proscribed competing political
ideologies by labeling them as un-American. In what would become the defining political
philosophy of the Know Nothing Party in Missouri, Kennett’s supporters began to campaign on a
platform labeled “Pure Americanism.” 74 Pure Americanism in many ways was merely a
continuance of manifest republicanism, but adapted for a new political party. Instead of focusing
simply on manifest destiny and republicanism, pure Americanism incorporated the anti-party
sentiment aroused by Know Nothings, and the belief that city politics could be purified only if
old party men like Benton were ejected. Their new ideological current would “relieve the space
from old fogyton-which is to wipe out all the crude notions that have obstained[sic] a roothold
for the last thirty year.” 75 Democrats opposed to the Know Nothing platform were described as
blind to progress, and preoccupied only by slavery and a Southern “chivalry” that “evince its
prowess, by striking down our national emblems and blotting out the stars and stripes from our
banner.” 76
The Kansas Nebraska Act further helped Know Nothings in their crusade to purify
politics. The act, proposed by Senator Stephen Douglas, supported slavery extension into new
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territories through popular sovereignty and tested the loyalties among Whig and Democrats. 77
Within Missouri, Benton and the Democrats had difficulty finding their footing in the aftermath
of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The Democrats were an amalgamation of pro and anti-slavery
extension members, and Benton was expected to offer a clear, hard-line on his stance. The
national discussion over the act forced Benton’s campaign into a storm of slavery debate solely
among Democrats, severely stunting his ability to campaign on issues that motivated Whigs to
the polls. Additionally, Democrats, already uncomfortable with Benton’s position on slavery
during the Compromise struggle, pressured the ex-senator to take a position during campaign
stops. Benton tried in vain to dodge discussing his particular feelings openly, which further
frustrated pro-slavery Democrats. 78
The Natives, however, found the Kansas-Nebraska Act yet another demonstration of the
systematic corruption and self-interest of national politicians unable to put the issue of slavery to
rest. Benton, the Whigs and Natives continually argued, belonged to this circle of corruption,
and was a “traitor to the state.” 79 Unlike the Know Nothings, the Democratic membership had a
large percentage of fervently pro-slavery voters who demanded a hard and fast stand on slavery
in Kansas. Democrats demanded a firm stance from Benton on the Kansas-Nebraska Act and
Benton again found himself defending his position as anti-slavery extension proponent. The
Know Nothings were largely apathetic on extension, and Kennett easily avoided falling into a
public debate over slavery.
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While Democrats were befuddled by the question of slavery extension, Know Nothings
could campaign on a more optimistic platform of economic progress, which further encouraged
support from new voters. Merchants, the campaign argued, were the new apostles of progress
and prosperity for the Union. Progress, however, could not continue without a steady stream of
government support for city projects, including new hospitals, educational centers, a new city
park and more improvements to the city’s port and levies. 80 As Kennett’s supporters argued, “a
great many men, laborers, mechanics, &c., who were poor then, and who are rich now; nay,
worth a hundred times more than in 1842; and to what do they own this but to the improvements
of the city.” Internal improvements, they repeatedly argued, were necessary for a wealthy,
contented city. 81 Without a full support of Kennett’s pure Americanism paradigm, Natives then
declared: “you will again be poor” 82 In total, the Kansas-Nebraska Act allowed Know Nothings
to brand themselves as the future, while labeling the Democrats as the party of old issues.
But as the election entered the last stretches, political rhetoric from Know Nothings
became tinged with intense nativism. Both the Republican and the Intelligencer offered fiery
commentary detailing alleged foreign plots to flood the streets with Irish and German gangs and
destroy the city’s cultural institutions.83 Nativist rhetoric grew in intensity in the last few months
as Democrats campaigned heavily for the foreign vote. Democrats blanketed Missouri
newspapers with campaign literature imploring immigrants to vote Democratic, declaring: “That
to those[foreigners]… who have the institutions of their native or adopted country and desire that
their children shall be freemen, imbued with democracy, we cordially extend an invitation to join
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and act with our party.” 84 For the divided Democrats, foreigners offered the best hope to
supplement their discontented rank and file members.
Kennett supporters capitalized on the anxiety surrounding the foreign vote and channeled
the discourse into vitriolic nativism. Both the Intelligencer and the Missouri Republican
dramatically stepped up its Nativist rhetoric in order to mobilize conservative Whigs. The
Republican suggested that Democrats were conducting their meetings in both the English and
German languages, and also visiting Irish and German slums to campaign for votes. 85 Nativism,
in consequence, became a convenient political tool for Know Nothings to motivate their
constituents to the polls.
As nativism became firmly entrenched in the Natives’ campaign strategy, Kennett
supporters made Henry Boernstein, the editor of a German language paper Anzenger des Westens
as a key target. 86 Boernstein’s influence as editor for the Democrats in many ways paralleled
Crockette. Both men established their papers for partisan purposes and exerted a significant
influence over the direction of their party through editorials and political promotion. Although
the comparisons are striking, their political ideologies never allowed them to find a common
ground. In the Natives’ view, Boernstein represented two key elements guaranteed to incite
Kennett supporters: He was German, and an active editor for the Democrats. Natives labeled
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Boernstein a foreign instigator, plotting to usurp “our social and political institutions-to unsettle
the very foundations of society.” 87
Furthermore, Boernstein began to antagonize the Nativists in the Anzenger in order to
motivate the dissatisfied Democrats, skillfully using Crockette’s editorial tactics against them.
“You are badly fixed” Boernstein proclaimed to the “poor” Know Nothings, “we pity you.” 88
Heading into the summer months, the editor of the Republican expressed anger and frustration
over Boernstein’s lengthy diatribes against the Kennett campaign, writing: “He[Boernstein], day
after day and for many weeks, continuously did publish in the “Anzeiger des Weatens[sic],”
incendiary articles, calculated to inflame the passions of the people.” 89 The Republican’s editor
then prophetically announced: “Tonight ‘Old Bullions’ will be found thrown off the track… all
owing to the stupidity and recklessness of the engineer Boernstein.” 90 Boernstein appealed to
the mayor for specialized protection of his printing office, and the Missouri Republican took
great pleasure in printing the editor’s plea in its paper, publicly mocking him on the front page.
“Let him behave himself and nobody will harm him” the editor condescendingly warned, “It is
his fears and his fright that are consellors[sic] in this case, coupled with an intimate desire to
produce riot and confusion on election day, so that he may profit by it.” 91
Just a few weeks before the pivotal election, the continual mud-slinging between the
editors had ratcheted up tensions between the two parties. In the last printed edition of the
Republican before the election, the paper offered a slew of sensational editorial pieces
purposefully fanning partisan flames. Reports filled the pages of the paper of possible voter
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fraud by Democrats, conspiracy theories surrounding Benton’s supposedly corrupted dealings in
Congress, and tales of Democratic chicanery. 92 Headlines spoke of a lurking threat of unnaturalized foreign voters flooding polls and voting Democrat, proclaiming: “Illegal Voters’ and
“Challengers be at Your Posts!” 93 Violence should be administered, the editor plaintively
maintained, if Democrats attempted “to force illegal votes into the ballot box, in such manner as
the Anzieger advises.” 94 The Republican’s editor carefully groomed its readers to prepare for a
possible riot in the city.
Indeed, on Election Day, after a few hours of peaceful balloting, the city erupted in full
scale violence at the site of a Ninth Ward ballot box in an immigrant slum. After days of gunfire
and dozens of confirmed deaths, the city not only had a new congressman in Luther Kennett,
they also had a new group in power, the Know Nothing Party. Days after the election and riot,
Natives came together for a City Council meeting to argue for state funding for a new police
squadron and reparations for the destroyed city. 95 The programs proposed during the council
meeting would become the first of many sweeping changes the Natives would make under the
auspices of progress and peace in the city.
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Conclusion:
The defeat of Benton destroyed the last semblance of commonality and negotiation
among the parties. In various moments in antebellum Missouri, the Whigs and Democrats found
common ground in their support of the Senator. But as Benton faded from the political scene, so
did their tenuous accord, and the legacy of compromise. The rise of the Know Nothing Party
behind Luther Kennett signaled a new era in Missouri politics characterized as progressively
minded, but divisive in spirit.
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CHAPTER 4
“RULE OR RUIN”: THE REIGN OF KNOW NOTHINGISM IN ST. LOUIS

In the autumn of 1854, the founders of the St. Louis Mercantile Library jubilantly
announced the grand opening of their permanent library facility, located at Fifth and Locust, in
the heart of the financial district. The building, one of the most opulently furnished public
spaces in the city, boasted two lecture halls, a reading room, and a boardroom. Precious artwork
adorned the walls and eighteenth-century Missouri manuscripts filled the burgeoning archives.
A standing monument to their political goals, the archival holdings celebrated St. Louis’s
Western heritage, while the architecture expressed their aspiration to be a modern metropolis. 1
The development of the building itself was not without its own revealing history. In a
savvy move to increase publicity and community excitement, the founders organized a design
competition, sending out a national call to all major cities. Their intentions were not solely to
garner attention for the library, but to display to the nation a new chapter in Missouri’s culture.
For much of the state’s history, the nation remained captivated by the belief in manifest destiny,
advocating the spread of American democracy and republican ideals across the plains. Although
Missouri stood as the model for this belief, the city retained much of its lawlessness, Western
identity and suffered growing pains post-statehood. 2 The group remained confident that the
mere design of the building would defy the dirty, uncivilized stereotype that plagued the city and
display the “pride of not only its membership and owners, but an intelligent community.” 3
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The design committee eventually selected St. Louis architect Robert S. Mitchell,
confident in the skills of their own local talent. After two years of construction, the committee
excitedly announced the grand opening of the library. After years of visitors speaking on
makeshift stages, St. Louis finally had a defined space to commemorate city events and host
prominent politicians and writers. The organizers settled on a balance between neo-classical and
Romanesque architecture, with grand arched windows and ornamental moldings along the
exterior. This desire for order, symmetry, and classical ideals gave visual representation to their
political goals. The design, fulfilling the committee’s ambitions, ensured the library would stand
in national prominence. The group’s avid ambition for intellectual engagement would soon
reveal to the nation exactly what they had hoped: St. Louis was on the cusp of a cultural
renaissance.
The Mercantile Library stood as an example amongst a sea of new cultural institutions
gaining influence in antebellum St. Louis. With the groundbreaking of each new institution, the
founders believed the community would slowly reform its bawdy behavior to fit these models of
middle-class decorum. 4 Founded and guided by the same individuals responsible for the Know
Nothing movement, each institution stood as a monument to the party’s aspirations and cast an
authoritative shadow upon the community.
In the months after the Know Nothings’ stunning 1854 election, they showed little
interest in the party spirit and bickering that came to define the contest. Instead, Natives refocused their attention on fostering an enlightened, sophisticated community of republican
westerners through a series of mutually oriented civic projects. The party’s intention was not
simply to enrich the moral integrity of the citizens in St. Louis, but to position the city as a
4
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national model for its republican ideal, pure Americanism. This large scale campaign of moral
suasion was deeply inspired by Unitarian minister William Greenleaf Eliot’s weekly sermons
that expressed a desire to recall basic Revolutionary principals, including honor and civic virtue.
Nativists aimed to spread these principals throughout St. Louis’s urban landscape, implementing
order and reform in a setting known nationally for its violent riots and dirty streets. 5 If pure
Americanism could reform even the most primitive of urban landscapes, then surely it could
serve as an organizing mechanism for metropolises in both the North and South, mitigating the
growing sectional tension the Know Nothings viewed as inhibiting human progress. The modern
city, the group poignantly argued, would save the country.
With the party’s goals defined, Natives found reform of the existing society necessary,
and they created two distinct, but complimentary reform projects: police and temperance reform.
By eliminating drinking and lawlessness, Know Nothings would be free to dream of St. Louis’
rebirth into an enlightened, culturally vibrant community that would eclipse the North and South
in wealth and intellect.
Building a Commanding Point: The Rise of an Institutional Infrastructure
The abrupt turn from aggressive political partisans to enlightened reformers requires us to
reflect on the original intentions of Yankee migrants as they settled within the city. Moved by
visions of a western Garden of Eden, travelers flocked to the region hoping to escape the slums
and corrupt city politics that plagued Boston and New York. 6 Throughout the jolts in Missouri’s
political culture, migrants clung to the belief that Missouri would become the setting for the rebirth of democracy- uncompromised by sectional tension and free from corruption and the
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personal ambition of Washington politicians. As I have argued, however, after years of
Democratic rule, a turbulent economy stalled state funding on internal improvements and the city
remained stagnant. Nonetheless, a new generation of elite city boosters inherited the belief of
Missouri exceptionalism and, with it, a driving ambition to fulfill the state’s destiny as a
commanding point for the American empire.
While city elites dreamed of pure Americanism, St. Louis residents endured the reality of
extremely violent and restless streets during this period. The city embodied what historians have
termed the frontier mentality: where community members administered justice on an individual
and frequent bases, and violence was common, with brothels and taverns dominating the streets. 7
Papers frequently reported deadly robberies and scuffles on the levees and the ineffectiveness of
the police authority made the community a hot bed for riots and revelry. The nation soon took
notice, labeling St. Louis as a dangerous and unruly frontier boomtown.
The frontier mentality began to wane as the city moved toward industrialization in the
1850s, witnessing the rise of an energetic group of elite merchants and traders. From their small
business outpost that dominated the financial district, these men watched anxiously as riots and
lynch mobs incited chaos outside their business doors. The lack of social order and civility stood
as a direct threat to their business prospects, and Northern investors were growing increasingly
cautious about investing in the volatile region. 8 If the social environment played a direct role in
the community’s character, then a complete remodeling of the city’s cultural infrastructure was
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desperately needed by the mid-1840’s. At the forefront of this movement were a host of familiar
men, including Luther Kennett, Wayman Crow, and George Budd. Institution building, they
theorized, could stand as prototypes for community behavior and serve as a prescription for the
turbulent streets. They designed an ambitious network of humanitarian organizations that
addressed the basic needs of the destitute, including education, healthcare, and Protestant
theology. Over time, they hoped these institutions would produce the social conditions
conducive to shaping civic-minded and respectable community members. In the words of one
planner, the group hoped to build a “nursery of future Greshams and Astors of statesmen, divines
and enlightened mechanics.” 9 Without direct reform, they feared the city would lose the contest
between the frontier mentality and bourgeoisie decorum.
The creators first tested institutional building with the establishment of Washington
University and the Mercantile Library, both in 1846. Education and intellectual fulfillment, as
their immediate choice implied, stood as the cornerstone of their institutional strategy. The
group desperately warned the public that “No time must be lost” in establishing an education
system for the fate of the city’s moral health depended on an educated youth. 10 This was
especially true for poor and orphaned juveniles. 11 Plans for scholarships and financial aid for the
poor were thoughtfully included in Washington University’s original charter, for the organizers
hoped to instill virtues of “industry and neatness” in the likelihood their parents “will not.” 12
This philosophy was as much political as it was a social cause. Over time, the group imagined
an increase in access to education would engender an educated populace that reflected their
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worldviews and aspirations for the region. “An education is not only the basis of public virtue”
one writer declared, “but the bulwark of freedom.” 13
Power and control seemed to be a particular concern for these men during this period.
The committee funded its organizations privately, allowing them to maintain maximum control
over the direction and message. 14 Membership in the Mercantile Library was subject to approval
by the board, and could be extended and revoked at its behest. Furthermore, the educational
program at the University maintained the power to “prescribe the course of instruction” and
“deem proper for the appointment of its professors, teachers and officers.” 15 In consequence the
party’s educational program for the city was inextricably linked to its own political and
economic interests. Not only would the children receive a traditional English education, but also
the program must include experimental course work to “enable them to earn a respectable living”
as judged by the committee. 16
The Mercantile Library soon emerged as the epicenter for elite culture and arts in St.
Louis. 17 The members eagerly filled the fifteen hundred capacity lecture hall, keen to listen to
distinguished writers and orators from across the country. Among the notables that visited St.
Louis on their speaking tours were Ralph Waldo Emerson, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Louis
Agassiz. 18 Moreover, the group sent out an ambitious set of lecture invitations to prominent
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politicians and scholars that revealed to the nation the hunger for intellectual enrichment in the
West. 19
The burgeoning cultural renaissance quickly affected the community, and civic spirit
flourished among the elite class. Printers often described these new institutions as “the finest in
the West”, emphasizing Missouri’s exceptionalism. 20 St. Louis may not have a transnational
railroad, one writer proclaimed, but the “the light of knowledge is radiating in every direction.” 21
Editors offered celebratory reports on the progress of the city, but urged citizens to flock to these
new organizations for the future “fame and prosperity of St. Louis” depended on their continual
support. In unison, the Whig press and the city elites championed the expansion and success of
these institutions, joining their future with the progress of the city.
But the founders hit an impasse by 1854. The tremendous growth in elite culture did not
trickle down toward the working class as the group had hoped. This was especially evident in
the large clusters of immigrants rooted in the Ninth Ward. Instead, immigrants chose to distance
themselves and create distinct institutions that catered to the various ethnic groups in the city,
including a German language newspaper the Anzeiger des Westens, a theatre, saloons, and even a
brewery. 22
Thus by 1854 the cultural economy in St. Louis grew increasingly secularized,
mimicking what historians of culture often describe as a “cultural hierarchy,” a tension between
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tradition and modernity that plagued the antebellum class system. 23 The creators found that
complete social re-organization required political authority. They needed the power to enforce
laws and institute reform from the top down.
Their fortunes quickly turned when they gravitated toward the Know Nothing Party. The
party inundated Missouri politics from both the state and local level with loyalists in alderman
positions, police squadrons, and eventually, the mayoral seat. Even the Whig paper, the
Missouri Republican offered complicity and political support to its rivals during this period as a
possible attempt to establish a friendly alliance. This political supremacy complimented the
already constant presence of Know Nothings in the boardrooms of St. Louis’s institutions. The
weakened Democrats and Whigs could only watch as Know Nothingism spread across the city,
taking their political offices and with it, their power. 24
Kennett, Crow, and George Budd found a political voice and a new identity in the Know
Nothing Party. Political office offered them legitimacy and a renewed purpose in the city. No
longer merely city boosters, the founders labeled themselves statesmen, honorably working
toward the benefit of the whole. Natives reveled in their growing influence, often likening
themselves to paternal figures, gifting the city with “moral and intellectual, if not religious
treasures.” 25 This paternalistic rhetoric, circulated in both the Intelligencer and the Missouri
Republican, contributed to the elites’ growing sense of responsibility in educating and regulating
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the spectrum of social camps in the city. They assumed the role as the head of household for the
community at large, dictating and controlling the behavior of residents.
But as the party’s roles changed, so did the scope of its goals. Winning a congressional
seat caused Natives to move beyond simply challenging the nation’s wild frontier conception of
the Missouri region. Civic spirit turned to a much more extensive, nationally-focused political
ideology. Inspired by its 1854 pure Americanism campaign, the party envisioned a stable and
robust city that would surpass the East both in cultural and economic prosperity. Filled with men
recently converted to the Know Nothing cause, the City Council quickly passed ordinances for a
variety of municipal projects that included city extension, broadly defined police powers, and a
host of internal improvements meant to beautify the city’s town center. 26 Visions of a “New
York of the West” dominated the party’s thoughts and transformed assumptions about the city’s
future. 27 Not only was the pure Americanism model an ideal organizing mechanism for their
own city, Nativists saw the potential for the paradigm to spread across the East and South,
circulating concepts of urban order and modernization.
Nativists’ conceptions of morality and proper behavior were in large part motivated by a
desire to recall Revolutionary principles of civic virtue and individual honor. The growth of the
modern city, Know Nothings found, had inadvertently left behind a sense of decorum and selfrestrain, resulting in a crisis of morality. 28 In lengthy op-ed pieces the Missouri Republican
urged its readers to embrace traditional American values, or what it termed as the “golden
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mean”-a balance between virtue and ferocity. 29 Recognizing an inherent wildness in Western
men, the group reasoned a delicate balance could be found within the community. Instituting
moral order- eliminating violence, the sex trade, and public drunkenness lay at the heart of this
balance. In a period of intense class division and violence, this moral balance created rules by
which Nativists could create a stable social order and act as a panacea to the frontier mentality.
In turn, Natives hoped that a new moral order would not only re-cast the Natives’ own
community’s identity, but also have a much more extensive impact on the moral fabric of the
nation, adding stability to an increasingly rootless society torn apart by political corruption and
sectional jealousies.
Imbued with a new sense of responsibility, the Know Nothings began a campaign under
the political slogan, “Rule or Ruin!” 30 The word slogan, however, belies the true purpose of the
mantra. “Rule or Ruin!” was in every sense a battle cry meant to shore up new voters and renew
the resolve of wavering supporters. Without complete Know Nothing hegemony, the slogan
protested, the city would be doomed to perpetual depravity. “We must guard the community”
William Eliot Greenleaf remarked, “from corruption.” 31 Nativists remained confident that the
party’s officials were the only agents in the city equipped to build and protect the moral integrity
of its community.
Armed with this new utopian vision, Natives dropped the antagonistic spirit that marked
the 1854 campaign and adopted a more amicable approach to its opponents. Growing
increasingly concerned with the cultural hierarchy and the tense political environment in its own
state, Natives sought to construct a harmonious community, impenetrable to class strife and
29
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partisan politics. While the surrounding states seemed mired in sectional jealousies, Natives
hoped to fortify the bonds amongst community members, urging readers: “How many bridges
have we among us?.” 32 This, of course, did not preclude party members from taking shots at
immigrants at particularly vulnerable political moments, but in general the public dialogue
remained fixed on building a stable, congenial environment.
This harmonious approach to political foes developed into a belief that St. Louis had a
significant role in fixing the deeply rooted sectional divide in the country. “The physical
greatness of our godly heritage” the party proclaimed, “enables us to gaze with a more patriotic
vision upon the miserable strife of extremely Northern and extremely Southern fanatics.” 33 Not
only were Missourians chosen by God, the editor explicitly stated, they were distinct from their
Southern and Northern brothers. Anyone outside the borders of Missouri was merely “bleary
eyed, weak-headed mortals” who lacked the capabilities to dream beyond “the limited range of
their own horizon.” 34 Their geographic distinctiveness equipped them to scrutinize the
weaknesses in American character objectively and amend society through their own, superior
behavioral standard.
But what were the shortcomings Nativists found so inhibiting to American progress?
Informed by an informal code of conduct that valued civic virtue, Know Nothings saw the
country’s cities ruled by corrupt community politicians, unrestrained passions, and poverty. 35
By the end of 1854, these ideas laid the groundwork for an expanded police force and
temperance. Both reforms struck at the heart of Natives’ ideas of a well-ordered society and
fulfilled their vision as a city rescued by the pure Americanism paradigm.
32
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The Rise of Washington King and a Professional Police Force
In the fall of 1854, William Greenleaf Elliot ascended the platform at Eliot Seminary to
give his second talk in a series titled “Three discourses on the causes of social disorder in
American cities.” 36 A mixture of Whigs and Natives sat in wooden pews, an audience the
popular Unitarian minister knew intimately. Eliot used the lecture series to target significant
social vices he found inhibiting the growth of St. Louis’ humanitarian institutions, including
election violence and intemperance. In the first lecture, Eliot took aim at the mob mentality
running rampant throughout America’s cities. “Enough has been done” the minister
remonstrated, “to bring disgrace upon us.” Eliot authoritatively advised the community on the
most prudent course of remedy to Missouri’s crime laden streets-an extensive reform of the
state’s criminal justice process. The lectures revealed to the community the Know Nothings’
new political platform for the next two years, beginning with the improvement of the city’s
volunteer police department.
Police reform was a reaction to years of frustration and hostility toward the lack of
professionalism and organization in the city’s municipal departments. St. Louis’s police
department depended heavily on a volunteer squadron. Men of all ages could be seen patrolling
the streets wearing makeshift yellow stars pinned to their chests, the only visible sign of
authority and justice for city residents. These volunteers lacked basic training and leadership, a
recipe for disaster in a city defined by its volatile streets and high murder rate. 37 Community
members and newspaper editors often complained about the ineffectiveness of amateur
volunteers in quelling riots and mob violence. In one infamous instance, a small fight among
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Irish immigrants on the levee dissolved into a large-scale riot after volunteer policemen and
fireman arrived on the scene and joined the fight. 38 In total, the community wrestled with
feelings of anxiousness and fear over the relative inability to maintain social order in an unpoliced, frontier city.
The lack of a professional unit was endemic of a much larger disagreement between
Democrats and Know Nothings over the role of law enforcers in St. Louis. Heretofore, law
enforcers in antebellum St. Louis were left to interpret the vagrancy laws at their discretion, and
judges supported this phenomenon by allowing police to arrest vagrants without warrants or
cause. 39 Law enforcers often focused primarily on protecting business and arresting bank
robbers and petty thieves, and not regulating the moral health of the city. 40 Nativists, however,
intended enforcers to take a much more aggressive stand on moral indiscretions, such as
prostitution and public intoxication. Moral indiscretions, coupled with the lack of a standing
police force, consumed the attention of Know Nothing officials looking to affect the greatest
amount of change on the streets in the shortest amount of time.
Public support of an expanded police force, however, had to be stirred. Although crime
was as natural to St. Louis’s streets as the inclement weather, it was traditionally considered a
part of frontier life, even exciting to many. 41 Law enforcers rarely intervened in moral
indiscretions and instead focused on protecting businesses in the city. Whig and Nativist editors
began to circulate an exaggerated crime narrative that flooded newspapers and monopolized the
front pages. Tales of small children senselessly doused in kerosene by drunken vagrants and

38

The Daily Missouri Republican, July 30, 1849.
Adler, “Streetwalkers”, 738.
40
Ibid, 740.
41
Patricia N. Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (NY: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1987).
39

78

degraded women roaming the streets (antebellum expressions for prostitutes) could most often be
found on the front page. 42 In order to demonstrate to a white readership the horrific danger in the
streets, dramatic crime stories uniformly involved white victims. These powerful images of a
morally bankrupt society profoundly influenced officials in the criminal justice system to reevaluate the role of municipal codes and police in policing the behavior and morality of the
public. 43
Ironically, the single event that pushed the city toward police financing came from
violence on behalf of its reformers. The 1854 election riot could have been quelled within a
matter of hours with an experienced police force, but the lack of organization and leadership
proved difficult to contain. The riot proved to skeptics that the city could no longer continue
with volunteers. 44 As parts of the city lay covered in broken glass and deserted bodies, civic
leaders gathered together for an informal meeting to regroup and create a strategy to contain any
remaining violence. Nativists capitalized on the opportunity and pushed the party’s reform
agenda, arguing for municipal funds to finance a salaried, professional organization. A paid
force, the party hoped, would bring a sense of honor and legitimacy to the justice system and
loyally defend the city from chaos.
Coincidentally, the Know Nothings were aided by an enormous gain in political
officeholders, primarily in the City Council and mayor’s office. Shortly after Kennett’s 1854
congressional win, Know Nothings quietly focused on yet another key election: the mayoral seat
formerly occupied by Kennett. Unlike the dramatic 1854 congressional election however, the
campaign for mayor remained a quiet affair and relatively unnoticed by the press, with
42
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Washington King winning easily. He assumed the command, ensuring the city would continue
under Know Nothing supremacy for at least another year.
Almost as soon as King became mayor, he started a crusade to re-shape the police
department. For King and his party, reform of the police entailed two basic principles, expand
and professionalize. Expansion happened relatively quickly. Armed by the ardent support of a
Know Nothing filled City Council, King easily secured funding for a paid police force. 45
Volunteers either embraced the new plan or resigned their police titles. Democratic volunteers
feared the Know Nothing backed police would increase the party’s influence in the city and
refused to stay on. 46 Overall, however, the city maintained an organized force, and the flight of
disgruntled Democrats remained insignificant.
As quickly as the force expanded, so did its role. The evolution of the criminal justice
system in St. Louis can be seen in the implementation of the vagrancy law passed in 1850.
When the City Council originally passed the ordinance, police broadly defined vagrants as
anyone causing mischief in the financial district, and they irregularly enforced the code. But as
Nativists replaced Whigs and Democrats in the city’s municipal departments, the term
“vagrants” could pertain to anyone, including women and children. 47 The broad, ill-defined code
allowed Nativists to exert a considerable amount of influence in defining acceptable and
unacceptable behavior through the execution of the ordinance. Ill-behaved women, juvenile
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delinquents, and rowdy saloon owners now faced much harsher and more aggressive police
attention and Nativists felt confident the law could finally rid St. Louis of its frontier conduct. 48
While the Know Nothings succeeded in expanding the force, professionalization was
compromised by King’s use of it as a party tool. He seemed to understand the benefits of having
a paid arm of the city under his power and often used it to his party’s advantage. German and
Irish business owners reported police harassment, and officers could frequently be seen on street
corners handing out Know Nothing literature. 49 The party and force became so intertwined, exvolunteers labeled the department as “contaminated” with partisanship. 50
The Know Nothing success in police reorganization spread to other volunteer municipal
institutions, including the fire department. 51 Quickly after police reform, the City Council voted
to finance a salaried fire department. Unlike the police force, the fire squad saw a mass exodus
of firemen. 52 The episode quickly became an ugly political matter for the Know Nothings as
Democrats charged political chicanery. Although King saw the benefits of a more authoritarian
arm of the party in the fire and police department, the community resented the flagrant
partisanship. It became clear to many, especially Democrats, that King saw both first and
foremost as a political tool.
Unfortunately for King, his tenure as mayor lasted only one year. By 1856, Howe
regained his political footing, aligned with the Democrats and the countless numbers of former
police and fire volunteers unwilling to subscribe to the Know Nothing- “contaminated”
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departments. 53 King’s legacy in the city, however, remained in his effort to revolutionize the
application of criminal justice in the city.
Temperance Movement:
In the fall of 1854, Know Nothings quietly started planning temperance ordinances for
the city. Natives first looked toward other large cities for guidance including London and New
York. 54 In language reminiscent of the Maine law, the city alderman passed a series of city
temperance ordinances that limited the sale of liquor on Sunday and limited the power of saloon
owners in the city. 55 For reformers, imbibing represented the grisly underbelly of the city they
wanted to purify. Conveniently, temperance legislation financially and socially debilitated the
party’s German and Irish political foes, the majority of saloon and tavern owners in the city.
Although not denying the inherent nativism imbedded in temperance, the ordinances had a much
more extensive goal.
While temperance legislation can be traced to the early Republic, the movement did not
gain momentum until the Jacksonian era. Recent analyses of temperance have pointed toward
the “modernization paradigm” as the central source of this growth in support. According to this
interpretation, the extreme economic and social changes market capitalism created prompted
middle-class merchants and artisans to bind together under a mutual cause that celebrated a
string of Protestant ideals including industry, restraint, sobriety, and virtue. As the modern class
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system began to take shape in America, a middle class ideology deeply rooted in Protestantism
began to rise, exerting a significant voice in American culture. 56
The modernization paradigm is particularly relevant in St. Louis as the Know Nothings
gained strength in the city. St. Louis’s enforcers established general temperance ordinances that
limited the sale of liquor on the Sabbath and created stern regulations for pubs and saloons in the
city. 57 A moral campaign allowed Know Nothings to join other groups, including the sons of
temperance, and exert a considerable amount of influence on the working class.
Temperance literature circulated throughout the city and proved to be popular among
readers, entertained by the lengthy narratives that filled the columns. In fact, temperance
literature was the most widely disseminated reform literature in the nineteenth century, and
reformers expertly employed a superior network of print materials that grew into considerable
relevance. 58 St. Louis benefited from a localized temperance newspaper The Missouri Cascade,
which published regularly in the antebellum period. Alliances with both the sons of temperance
and the Cascade maintained the Know Nothing’s political momentum and increased its
promotion during city elections.
The ideology of temperance appealed to Missouri Know Nothings for two important
reasons: genuine agreement and political strategy. First, the moral degradation paradigm fit well
with the Nativists newly developed campaign for urban order. For many reformers, the liquor
trade was a significant source of the American lapse in moral judgment and behavior. “We will
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never become a strictly law abiding people” Eliot passionately proclaimed, “until one of the
enacted laws is that of temperance.” 59 Accounts of drunkenness filled the pages of both the
Intelligencer and Cascade, creating a “human face” for temperance legislation. 60 Narratives
typically followed a consistent scheme: A family torn apart by an weak male head of household
unable to control his drinking. Tales often ended with a dramatic death of a female child at the
hands of a drunken father, representing the death of virtue in a society besotted with alcohol
consumption.
Along with the vision of broken families, temperance literature suggested that abstinence
restored an individual’s respectability- an all-encompassing term to describe virtue and honor. 61
This summation appealed particularly to St. Louis Natives, looking to redefine the moral fabric
of Missourians. A respectable man remains stoic, maintaining complete control of both his
physical and emotional impulses. In contrast, temperance formulas characterized an inebriated
head of household as incapable of controlling his temper and pocketbook, spoiling the honor of
the family as a whole. Respectability, reformers avowed, was antithetical to an intemperate
society.
Although Natives’ subscribed to the moral degradation paradigm, the crusade held a
strategic value for the party as well. Temperance literature seduced new members and fortified
the resolve of the party’s supporters. 62 During the decisive few months after the group’s
congressional win, Natives formed a crucial alliance with yet another partisan paper, the
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Cascade. Editors of the Cascade were wholly devoted to temperance, and the paper served as
the predominant source for temperance literature in the state. In addition, the editors also
published political accounts of elections, tacitly supporting the movement. Alderman elections
often appeared in the left hand corner of the front page coinciding with the editor’s routine
opinion essay. Temperance literature became a powerful campaign tool for Know Nothings
looking for publicity and outreach.
Furthermore, temperance legislation acted as a mechanism to limit immigrants’ political
power. 63 Bars and saloons in St. Louis filled the ninth ward with naturalized and un-naturalized
immigrants creating large social networks that, for the most part, stayed confined within their
own groups. Particularly within the Irish culture, alcohol consumption was deeply interwoven in
the cultural fabric and acted as a form of social expression. 64 Nativists identified the saloons as
an important political center for immigrant groups and attacked these buildings first during the
1854 election riot. Broken windows and battered doors revealed the political and social
hostilities and elevated the tensions between these groups. Structures, Natives found, could, and
were, easily re-built. Laws, however, could permanently limit foreign influence by destroying
the groups’ social and economic refuges.
Nativists never saw the complete abandonment of alcohol consumption in the city. The
community largely ignored the ordinances as well as the reformers’ attempts to vilify alcohol and
salon keepers. Even Washington King found temperance a difficult path to follow and was
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widely reported to enjoy liquor even on the Sabbath. 65 Redefining a community’s moral health,
Know Nothings once again found required acquiescence from the whole.
Conclusion:
Although the Know Nothings focused most of their attention on internal improvements
and temperance, reform was quickly taking hold across St. Louis in a variety of city institutions
including public schools, banking, and healthcare, but with mixed results. In total, the Know
Nothing Party was critical in developing and guiding social reform during these years. But as
the next chapter will demonstrate, this radical alliance of reformers would soon fall apart, torn by
the very issue that drew disillusioned members into the movement: slavery.
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CHAPTER 5
“THE LONG AGONY” 1: VIOLENCE AND DISORDER ON MISSOURI’S HOME
FRONT
A blush of roses
Where rose never grew!
Great drops on the bunch grass,
But not of the dew!
A taint in the sweet air for wild bees to shun!
A stain that shall never Bleach out in the sun!
Back, steed of the prairies!
Sweet song-bird, fly back!
Wheel hither, bald vulture!
Gray wolf, call thy pack!
The foul human vultures
Have feasted and fled;
The wolves of the Border Have crept from the dead
John Greenleaf Whittier 2

As Nativists pursued their dream of a modern city, proslavery Missouri farmers
were locked in a violent struggle to secure slaveholding across their state border in
Kansas. Few people anticipated the intensity of violence that unfolded in Kansas.
Initially sparked by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, migrants from both the North and South
flooded the region in hopes of controlling the admission of the territory as either a slave
or free state. While Stephen Douglas, the author of the bill, imagined Kansas could
demonstrate the benefits of popular sovereignty in placating sectional tensions, it instead
created a proxy civil war between sections. Advocates from both sections prophesized
that the events in Kansas would determine the fate of slavery in America. In response to

1

“The long agony” is a term used in editorials across Kansas, including Leavenworth Daily Times, January
30, 1861, as found in Albert Castel’s work, Civil War Kansas: Reaping the Whirlwind (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1997), 1.
2
John Greenleaf Whittier, Marais Des Cynes, 1858, Bleeding Kansas: A Narrative of Guide to the Sources,
http://www1.assumption.edu/ahc/Kansas/default.html, (Accessed September 2, 2011).

87

this prediction, ruffians organized covert militias to compete for a sectional advantage,
thwarting any chances of a democratic process in the region.

The violence in Kansas marked an unfortunate turn in the relationship between
ruffians, and consequently, national compromise. Skirmishes between forces occurred so
commonly that Horace Greeley prophetically termed the conflict, “bleeding Kansas.” 3
Greeley’s expression precisely exposed the violent culture that captured residents and
migrants of Kansas from 1856 to 1858. The territory of Kansas was akin to a battlefield,
with both groups creating hierarchical militias, traveling with cannons, and collecting
prisoners of war at every confrontation. 4 Unlike customary theatres of battle, the
violence in Kansas transcended the traditional boundaries of war. 5 Ruffians firmly
placed violence in the domestic sphere, invading and pillaging affluent homes and towns
and taking prisoners along their trail. 6 Violence had irretrievably replaced cooperation in
the region, a foreboding sign for the fate of compromise in the national political scene.

3

Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 190-191.
Information about ruffian takings prisoners of war can be found in numerous personal letters and diaries
of survivors of the conflict, including Spencer Kellogg Brow, Diary entry, January 1, 1857, Repository for
Territorial History,
http://www.territorialkansasonline.org/~imlskto/cgibin/index.phpSCREEN=border&topic_id=75&search=
Osawatomie,%20Battle%20of, (accessed July 2, 2011).
5
In Neely’s book, The Border Between Them, he describes the pattern of violence as “a newfound ferocity
to the struggle” that “set in motion a pattern of retaliatory guerrilla violence.” (57). This new style of
guerilla warfare, he argues, stripped away “the conventional boundaries of the territorial struggle” as it was
waged primarily “in and upon settlers’ households, and nearly every home seemed to become a potential
target.” (57). For more in-depth description of this new style of guerilla warfare, see Neely’s, The Border
Between Them.
6
Jeremy Neely convincingly argues in his work, The Border Between Them, that the sack of Lawrence and
the murders at Dutch Henry Creek marked a “grim turning point” in the violence in the Kansas region,
where brutal violence and guerilla warfare became the norm, as ruffians used violence to sway the vote,
instead of political channels (56). For more information on the sack of Lawrence, and the murders at Dutch
Henry Creek, see: T.H. Goodrich, Bloody Dawn: The Story of the Lawrence Massacre (Kent: Kent State
University Press, 1991). Neely’s work, and Etcheson’s, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil
War Era.
4
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Most historians have missed the opportunity to illustrate the role Missourians
played in the conflict and in turn, their activity profoundly transformed Missouri politics
in the later half of the 1850’s. 7 For Missourians, Kansas was foremost a personal
conflict. As a bordering state, Missourians shared territory and financial relationships
with native residents of Kansas and felt a kinship to the region unlike other foreign
migrants. 8 Kansas was Missourians’ home front, and they naturally feared that the fate of
Kansas was intrinsically tied to their own economic autonomy and livelihood. 9 As
abolitionists inched closer toward the adjoining border, citizens reacted with desperation
and brutal violence. Both Missouri’s senior senator and governor would not only permit
farmers to join the conflict, they would actively recruit and lead ruffians into the region in
order to “rescue” their neighbors from tyranny. By 1856, just two years after Douglas’s
legislation, Missourians uniformly disregarded popular sovereignty in favor of brute
force. 10

While border ruffians exchanged combat miles away, the public in St. Louis
watched in horror and fear. Missourians had always defined themselves against the
sectional fanaticism of the North and South. Now, they watched as their community
became a setting for the growing sectional fervor. Confrontations often unfolded miles
7

While they often acknowledge their presence in the conflict, they rarely indicate the extent of their role.
Both Potter and Etcheson allude to the Missouri presence but do not go into detail about their motivations
to cross the border into Kansas. I cannot fault either historian, given the purpose and scope of their
respective works. Instead, I am merely pointing out a gap in the historiography.
8
Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 43.
9
At first, free soil ruffians only amounted to roughly four percent of the population, but as native residents
grew frustrated with the inundation of pro-slavery migrants, the faction grew considerably larger and more
aggressive. Many rural Missourians expected to extend their farms into the Kansas territory. For Missouri
farmers, Kansas embodied their distinct vision of manifest destiny-rolling hills waiting to be claimed and
tamed. Their visions of unencumbered growth, however, were punctuated by the growing free-soil
presence in the region that inevitably led to the fanatical support of slavery. For more information about
Southern migrants in Kansas, see Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, Chp. 2.
10
Ibid.
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outside the Missouri border, and ruffians from the east and west inundated Missouri,
searching for quick access points into the Kansas territory. As a consequence of Kansas,
Missourians could no longer remain isolated from the growing hysteria. The violence
forced Missourians to regain their lost sectional loyalties, inherently dividing the political
and social culture in Missouri. Sectional loyalties soon formed a significant portion of
the Missourians’ identity, a shift that precipitated another party re-alignment and the
withdrawal of Yankee migrants from the region. As a result, nationalism and community
solidarity in St. Louis dissolved by the end of 1858.

Only within this contextual frame can we fully understand the failure of the Know
Nothing Party in St. Louis. Know Nothings unwittingly became stuck between two
worlds: one of communitarianism and another where absolutism and slavery gained
centrality. After years of promoting social welfare and nationalism to an energetic
community, Natives now encountered a fractured and disillusioned public. After the
bleeding Kansas fiasco the issue of slavery and its future became inexorable in the minds
of Missourians, severing any chords of unity and compromise among rural and city
residents. The city had moved forward, the Know Nothings discovered, but not in the
direction the group anticipated. Sectional fanaticism replaced a desire for order, and the
Know Nothing movement inevitably lost favor in St. Louis society.

The general unraveling of the Know Nothing Party foreshadowed a meaningful
shift in the community’s identity and ambitions. No longer inspired to reform American
society with institutional building, residents became consumed with sectional rivalry, and
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a general feeling of suspicion and chaos filled the air. The heart of the republic had lost
its source of optimism in the midst of Kansas, causing residents to question their belief in
Missouri exceptionalism and Western regeneration. Natives learned a lesson similar to
countless Americans before them; While the popular “City on a Hill” rhetoric can serve
as an inspiring political ideology, it does not have the capacity to control the compelling
political and economic landscape. In the case of the Know Nothing Party, national
tensions cast an ominous shadow onto the city and the political culture in Missouri soon
devolved into a microcosm of the national political chaos.

Railroad Itches: The Continental Railroad and the Collapse of Missouri Exceptionalism

By the end of 1856, the Know Nothing members’ confidence in St. Louis was
soaring. After a swift sweep into city and state politics, the Know Nothings oversaw an
extensive map of reform projects that modernized St. Louis. Besides a public library and
national university, Know Nothings directed advances in public healthcare and primary
education. With its cultural stamp on the city’s character evident, Know Nothings stood
atop a new bureaucratic city order.

Inevitably cracks in the party’s plan began to form, and by 1857, the Know
Nothings encountered an insurmountable obstacle: the courting of the trans-continental
railroad. The railroad project, discussed and planned by city officials for decades, united
the public in a shared fantasy for the future of St. Louis. A railroad hub, the public
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dreamed, would bring an unending flood of wealth and revenue and increase the city’s
influence nationally. Prospectors believed St. Louis was the ideal site to unite southern
and northern railroad tracks and they aligned with the Pacific railroad company-a mixture
of politicians, private investors and engineers-to raise public support for a government
contract. The potential St. Louis hub would serve as the entrance to the West, opening
western expansion toward the California coast. The transcontinental railroad hub, in
consequence promised to secure sizeable revenue for the city and finally solidify St.
Louis’s position as a commanding city similar to New York City and Boston.

“Railroad mania” swept across St. Louis and by 1853 Nativists took charge of an
organized campaign for the hub. 11 City boosters and printers purposefully fostered a
favorable political and financial environment for the railroad, including hosting railroad
conventions and sponsoring glowing railroad editorials that often covered up the rampant
corruption and mismanagement. “There is a great race” the Republican editor implored,
“in which she[St. Louis] ought to run, and run swiftly, for the supremacy…of more
extensive inland commerce than the earth has ever yet seen.” 12 Nativist editors promised
fast cash, unchecked prosperity, and new commercial opportunities to the public. A
transcontinental railroad center symbolized the consummation of civility and modernity
for the West. They had finally tamed the frontier West and curbed the frontier mentality
that characterized it. The railroad promised to be the talisman among their institutional
infrastructure, and they pursued it with vigor.

11

The term “Railroad Mania” is a term used by Adler to describe the frenzy that followed the railroad
dream in St. Louis. See, Adler, Yankee Merchants, 119.
12
The Daily Missouri Republican, November 4, 1854.
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Yet railroad builders never invested their own money in rail projects. 13 Instead,
Nativists and other city boosters borrowed money and arranged for favorable tax
subsidies- all in hopes of luring builders into the region. Luther Kennett, along with
other leading Nativists, organized separate investment groups to raise and buy railroad
stock. These investment groups became so common in St. Louis they inevitably began to
compete with each other. In addition, city councilmen re-organized the city charter to
include the subscription of railroad stock from city taxes in hopes of speeding up
construction for the project. 14 By 1850, the city of St. Louis invested more money in a
pacific railroad than any other region in America. 15 All of these investments amounted to
a tangled web of city and state capital, inextricably tied to a fantasy.

But the emotional and financial investments turned into a losing gamble.
Nativists assumed the Pacific Railroad Committee-comprised of engineers, policymakers
and investors-would take note of the extensive internal improvements and consider St.
Louis’s potential as a model American city. In hindsight it was clear that St. Louis’s
volatile economy and inclement weather proved to be a substantial risk. 16 Furthermore, a
local engineer commissioned by the Pacific Railroad Committee noted that while the city
had mad tremendous strides in modernization, outlining bridges and roads required
massive improvements before any substantial locomotive transportation could be

13

For more information about the financial schemes and corruption in the transcontinental railroad
company, see Richard White’s, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America
(NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).
14
Adler, Yankee Merchants, 119- 120.
15
Arenson, The Great Heart of the Republic, 67.
16
Ibid, 66.
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achieved. 17 By 1857, not a single track of railroad had been laid for the hub. In a bitter
twist, officials in Chicago, St. Louis’s newly rising western rival, received word that it
had been chosen as the Western hub for the railroad. Unlike Missouri that lacked a firm
commitment to statewide improvements, Illinois appeared to be a safer investment for
committee members unsure of the uneven growth in Missouri.

The economic implications of the loss would not be seen until the financial panic
in the summer of 1857, but the psychological effects were immediate and significant.
The defeat shook many merchants and investors to their cores, creating a general sense of
apprehension. 18 For decades, these men had steadfastly devoted their time and money to
designing a model environment, assuming both riches and perpetual growth would
immediately follow. Had they bet on the wrong western city? This question gained
widespread traction among merchants and the financial elite.

The results of the fiasco effectively shattered the romantic image Nativists held
for St. Louis. Their dreams of fast cash and western supremacy had been thoroughly
dashed by the growing support for Chicago. Left “humiliated” and defeated, Nativists
focused their attention on completing the tracks of railroad unfinished by corrupt
builders. 19 Unbeknownst to Nativists, the loss of the railroad center would mark the

17

This includes a particularly deadly collapse of the Gasconade Bridge in Jefferson County in 1855 that left
almost fifty dead and many more wounded. News reached the Pacific Railroad Committee and, as Adam
Arenson argues, persuaded the committee that the Missouri region was not equipped to handle a
transcontinental railroad. See: Ibid, 77-78.
18
See Ibid, 146-152.
19
Examples of this can be found in the following sampling of editorial articles: The Daily Missouri
Republican, June 4, 1858, Ibid, June 13, 1858, and Ibid, August 8, 1858.
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closing chapter in their institutional re-modeling campaign, serving as an ominous sign of
the general economic and political decline in the city.

Slavery and the Rise of the Democratic Party in St. Louis

Both the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Transcontinental railroad failure added a
new angle in Missouri politics, animating sectional loyalties and the issue of slavery
resurfacing. The issue became exceedingly more heated in the following two years and
caused northerners and southerners to view each other as enemies, indicating that a
sectional compromise was unlikely.

As a political party serving mostly urban St. Louis, Natives avoided directly
addressing the issue of slavery for most of its political tenure. This tactic was helped by
the fact that slavery played only a small role in the city’s social culture. 20 During the
1850’s, slaves only accounted to roughly one percent of the population, with free blacks
almost two percent. 21 Within the city, the only traces of slavery were economic, as
slaveholders traveled to the city with wagons full of tobacco, grain and sugar cane for the
city’s commercial market. 22 Although slavery held a constant presence in St. Louis’s

20

Although Missouri was considered one of the first territories to extend the plantation system, the regime
only supported small farms with very few slaves. Partly due to the unpredictable climate, and the southern
migrants’ lack of capital, prosperous plantations with large slave labor gangs were a rarity in the state. see:
Diane Mutti Burke’s On Slavery’s Border: Missouri’s Small Slaveholding Households, 1815-1865 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2010).
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Primm, Lion of the Valley, 179.
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the purpose of extending slavery and southern values into new territories. For more information on rural
Missouri slavery, see: R. Douglas Hurt’s Agriculture and Slavery in Missouri’s Little Dixie (Kansas City:
University of Missouri Press, 1992).
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daily economy, Know Nothings rarely referenced the institution. 23 Instead, the party
continued to focus on St. Louis’s commercial prospects, branding itself as the party of
economic progress and innovation.

While the divide among pro-slavery Democrats and Unionist Natives was
apparent, the state was by no mean fractious. Instead, what bound rural and urban
dwellers together was a strong national identity, fortified by a shared belief in Manifest
Republicanism. 24 Until the mid-1850’s, the domestication of the wilderness and the
building of a state infrastructure occupied the minds and hearts of most Missourians. In
consequence, the issue of slavery remained isolated and contained in rural Missouri, both
physically and metaphorically. Neither ignoring nor confronting slavery, Missourians
had learned to compete and debate over economic issues instead.

But the alarm bells in Kansas began to ring louder, and by the summer of 1856,
the violence in the region touched Missouri politics and pulled slavery from the margins
of the political imagination. Missouri’s involvement in Kansas began with the agency of
a few fanatical pro-slavery politicians, most notably Senator David Rice Atchison. 25
Atchison’s primary political goal for the majority of his career was to ensure the spread

23

This of course is with the exception of a few notable cases, including William Greenleaf Eliot who often
presented passionate appeals on behalf of abolitionism in his Sunday sermons. See: Arenson, The Great
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24
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not conservative in his pro-slavery views. While Atchison has not received a full academic treatment in
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of slavery into western territories, and he did so with a passion. Unlike Luther Kennett
and Thomas Hart Benton who viewed the West as the starting place to create a sense of
nationalism in the country, Atchison remained faithful wholly to the South and slavery.
Like the growing majority of Democrats in Missouri, Atchison believed that the West
was the ideal setting to practice self-government and continue the practice of slavery in
new territories.

Beginning in the summer of 1854, both Atchison and Missouri’s Governor
Hancock Lee Jackson began an intensive campaign to lure Missouri men to cross the
border and “rescue” Kansas men from the lawlessness. 26 This included proslavery
meetings across rural Missouri, motivating farmers to temporarily settle in Kansas and do
whatever was necessary to ensure a proslavery vote for the territory. Atchison supplied a
healthy sum of Missouri ruffians for the South, eager and dutifully prepared to go to
battle in Kansas and defend what he considered a direct threat to “Our institutions.” 27
Atchison’s war zeal was so virulent in Kansas, he famously advised his Missouri ruffians
“to give a horse thief, robber, or homicide a fair trial, but to hang a negro thief or
Abolitionist, without judge or jury.” 28

The violence in Kansas did not remain isolated from Missouri politics. Atchinson
expertly channeled this fervor into a passionate support of slavery in the political

26

“Come to the Rescue!”, broadside, September 6, 1856, Missouri Historical Museum,
http://www.civilwarmo.org/gallery#item/CWMO-134, (Accessed September 3, 2011).
27
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sphere. 29 In the Missouri state legislature, where a virulently pro-slavery faction of the
Democrats led by Atchison began to voice a considerably more extreme pro-slavery
position and argued against the Missouri Compromise. 30 Instead, Atchison and his
followers believed in the extension of slavery into all territories by way of the political
doctrine popular sovereignty. 31 While Whigs supported Benton and the Missouri
Compromise, Democrats in the state legislature actively campaigned against the former
Democratic leader and their more moderate support of slavery. The future of the West,
according to both groups, would either be characterized by regional cooperation or
popular sovereignty. By the close of 1856 Democrat were a united party and defeated
any Whig representatives in the legislature, and therefore, any challenge to Southern
interests at the state level. Democrats took over the Missouri state legislature with
relative ease, and soon had eyes on re-claiming St. Louis as a Democratic stronghold
once again. 32

There are several reasons why Democrats focused on St. Louis politics for their
next campaign goal. First and foremost, the city held the majority of the region’s capital
and commercial markets. Slaveholders’ financial livelihood depended on the city’s
commercial markets. Thus, having political control over the direction of St. Louis’s
29

I do not intend to describe Atchison’s political maneuvering as merely strategy. Instead, he wholly
believed in the gospel of slavery and, in consequence, no longer believed that compromise was in the best
interests of the South. For more information about Atchison’s political and ideological viewpoints, see
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economy benefited the Democrats’ polity directly. Furthermore, the Know Nothings, the
only other sizable political party in the region at this point, held a monopoly in the city’s
government, and a seat in Congress. Thus, conquering St. Louis would increase the
Democrats’ influence over both the rural and urban areas of Missouri, while
simultaneously debilitating its only political foe in the region.

What the Nativists were not willing to confront, the Democrats were more than
willing to expose. Democrats characterized Nativists as the party of abolitionists, and
described leaders as “black vomit.” Furthermore, Democratic newspapers throughout the
region denounced the party as an extension of the Republican Party, a loaded charge in
the South. 33 These assaults firmly put slavery in the political discourse and Know
Nothings found it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to ignore slavery.

The politicization of the fugitive slave clause in St. Louis further compounded the
Know Nothings’ troubles. In part a reaction to rural Missourians’ legitimate fear of their
own slaves escaping to Kansas, Democratic papers publicly questioned how Know
Nothings would approach the Fugitive Slave Act. Would they aid the slave or the slave
catcher in St. Louis? City dwellers found the question altogether vexing. A majority of
residents may not have been fervently pro-slavery, but the accusations caused a deep
worry that their city could become a sanctuary city for fugitive slaves. 34

33

Proslavery forces within the city employed this incendiary rhetoric to further incite the city’s Irish
population, who supported Atchison’s Kansas cause. For more information on the city’s newspaper
rhetoric, please see: Adler, Yankee Merchants, 128-129.
34
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The Know Nothings reacted to the barrage of attacks with a carefully constructed
set of resolutions on slavery, a dangerous move for Nativists. Henry Rollins, a senior
Know Nothing leader, arranged for a public meeting among party members to create a
new political platform. In comparison to the Know Nothings’ pure Americanism
platform, this agenda finally acknowledged slavery and largely ignored internal
improvements. 35 The resolutions called for a strict adherence to the Fugitive Slave
Clause, a particular concern for many Missourians who worried that slaves in Missouri
would escape to Kansas. Furthermore, the party denied Congress the power to legislate
on slavery in states where it already existed, or to exclude the institution from states
entering the Union. It offered more concessions to pro-slavery members than to antislavery while not being particularly aggressive.

The Know Nothing leaders never meant the resolutions to be a definitive stance
on slavery. They hoped the vague language and a weak support of slavery would appease
both sides. Instead, Democrats found the resolutions an affirmation that the Know
Nothings were weak supporters of the institution, and in consequence, the southern cause.
The political attacks continued, and sectional sympathies among city residents ballooned.
Local newspapers regularly featured advertisements and business reports that emphasized
these tensions, including proud affirmations of the growing southern character in the
city. 36

35
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In response to the depth of divisions in Missouri, Know Nothings reintroduced
pro-Unionism as the centerpiece of their platform. Reminiscent of their original beliefs
in Unitarianism, Know Nothings tried in vain to reconcile with Democrats over slavery
and move forward as a unified state. The concluding paragraph of its charter included an
oath of allegiance to the Union, and its preservation. 37 The belief in Unionism
temporarily joined the St. Louis branch with Know Nothings across the country, where
preservation of the Union took priority. 38

Perhaps the strongest blow to the party, however, was the loss of its editorial
support. St. Louis’s major daily newspaper and Know Nothing supporter inexplicably
switched sides, and became the Democrats’ strongest editorial voice in the city. It is not
clear how or even why the Republican shifted its support, but the effects were immediate.
Know Nothings depended on editorials not only for campaigns, but also for its public
support of the various social works programs they enacted just a year earlier.

In the summer of 1857, Know Nothing Party lost it’s most powerful political seat
when Luther Kennett failed in his re-election campaign. After a stunning election win
that vaulted the party into statewide prominence, Kennett now stood poised for reelection
in a growing Democratic city. With the political baggage of the Know Nothings
weighing heavily upon his campaign, Kennett could do little but hope that Democrats

37
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would fail at gathering support in the region. Outnumbered by Democrats and unable to
muster editorial support, Kennett’s failed reelection campaign stood as a glaring sign of
the groups rapidly dissolving power in the region.

The Panic of 1857

The summer of 1857 marked the closing chapter of the Know Nothing Party in St.
Louis. Only weeks after Kennett’s loss, America suffered a significant financial panic
that permanently reshaped the financial and social demography of St. Louis. After
suffering steep financial losses, merchants and speculators in the city abandoned the
Know Nothing Party and returned to their eastern cities in search of new economic
opportunities.

The panic began on August 24th, 1857, with the collapse of Ohio Life, an eastern
investment bank. Rumors rapidly spread throughout Wall Street of the failure and
national stock market suffered a steep decline. 39 The bank’s failure, however, spooked
anxious financiers already worried about a slow foreign market. Just hours after the
rumors originally circulated, investment banks throughout Wall Street halted any further
loans for merchants, which resulted in a serious financial panic in America. After a
string of bank failures, the recession sparked a steep decline in American exports and a
massive recall of bank loans for struggling merchants. By September, bank loans were
39

My summary of the panic of 1857 is, of course, a short discussion. For a more in-depth look at the panic,
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scarce, the stock market was steadily dropping, and Americans waited in a state of
perpetual alarm. 40 Local and state financial institutions were rapidly deteriorating, and
congressmen scrambled to find a lifeline for the American economic system. 41

News of the panic spread quickly to St. Louis. While the telegraph transmitted
news of the bank failures just hours after Wall Street suffered the first collapse, railroads
carried northern newspaper reports to the region just days later. 42 In consequence, the
people of St. Louis experienced the terror and panic on Wall Street almost as quickly as
easterners, and it occupied the attention of periodicals across Missouri.

For St. Louis, like many western cities, the financial implications were
devastating. The speculative investments and mismanagement of railroad investors
crushed western land prices and effectively stalled any eastern investments from flowing
into the region. Furthermore, the panic caused the massive railroad financial mess to
crumble beneath investors. Dozens of St. Louis investment groups closed operations and
both northern and foreign markets all but suspended trade and bank loans in the region. 43

The panic confirmed to many merchants the end of an era. Southerners and
Democrats had inundated St. Louis streets and political culture, and St. Louis grew
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increasingly more fiscally conservative, and pro-slavery. 44 An increasing number of
Southern merchants settled in the city, forging a much stronger commercial connection
with the South than previously held. Evidently still suspicious of Northern markets, an
increasing number of lawmakers found the South a more reliable financial partner. 45 St.
Louis, Nativists found, no longer held the promise of prosperity and new beginnings.
Instead, it faced the same innate sectional tensions and turbulent markets that they had
hoped to avoid.

Shortly after the panic, merchants abandoned St. Louis in 1857 and 1858. 46 From
the period of 1857 to 1860, the city directory reveals a sharp decline in self-identified
businessmen and merchants in the city. Indeed, historian Jeffrey Adler notes that a
sizeable majority of St. Louis residents fled shortly after the cultural and political turn in
the city, unable or unwilling to keep their businesses afloat without the support of
Northern markets. 47 Moreover, the increasing reliance on small, southern firms for
financing sharply limited the type and scale of businesses in the city. St. Louis merchants
started a steady and quick migration out of the city from 1857-1858. Some migrated to
Chicago, while others returned to the North. 48

44

Ibid, 157.
Ibid.
46
My point that Yankee merchants left the region shortly after the panic is informed by two sources. First,
Jeffrey Adler offers a lengthy discussion of the exodus of Yankee merchants in his work, Yankee
Merchants, 152. Furthermore, by establishing a list of Know Nothing merchants and checking the St.
Louis business directory, I found confirmed Adler’s assumption. For more information about the St. Louis
directory, see: Kennedy’s City Directory from 1857 to 1860,
http://www.rollanet.org/~bdoerr/1860CyDir/1860CD.htm, (Accessed September 20, 2011).
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid, 166.
45
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One of the most notable Know Nothing escapees exposed in the directory was
J.B. Crockette, who had famously served as the Nativists’ editorial voice for their first
three years. 49 It is not clear where Crockette moved, or if he stayed in the printing
business. His abandonment, perhaps more than any of the other party men symbolized
the significance of this flight for the party.

The Know Nothing Party, in consequence, was effectively deserted by 1858. Not
only did the majority of its constituency leave the city, many of its leading voices were
defeated in city alderman elections. Luther Kennett, Washington King, and Crockette
left the city and the Missouri political scene. Some men who continued to use the Know
Nothing label only did so as independent voters. 50 Altogether, the Know Nothing Party
disappeared as the Missouri party culture returned to a one-party system.
By 1858, St. Louis was reborn. After the great flight St. Louis resembled a
southern city, both in demographics and politics. 51 Although some merchants stayed in
the region, they could not stem the tide of southern values and fiscal conservatism from
invading city institutions. 52 St. Louis politics became a one-party system and the
Democrats regained hegemony in the region.

49

Ibid.
Mering, The Whig Party in Missouri, 211.
51
Many historians overlook the great flight in 1857, and its effect on St. Louis political culture. For more
information, see Adler, Yankee Merchants.
52
Ibid, 173.
50
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

By 1861, the dream of creating a national model of American Unionism was
shattered by slavery politics. On April 12, 1861 Confederate forces opened fire on Fort
Sumter and officially commenced the American Civil War. In a note of irony, St. Louis
finally stood as a commanding site during the conflict. The St. Louis Arsenal and the
city’s position on the Mississippi River served as a strategic point in the Western theatre. 1
The war, however, effectively dissolved any remaining national bonds among city
residents. Although the state officially voted against secession, the decision was wrought
with resistance and tension, much of which was evident throughout the city.

At the close of the Civil War, the city suffered from a significantly reduced trade,
a depleted population, while the surrounding states still suffering internally from the
sectional divisions the war exposed. 2 Between the fall of the Know Nothing Party and
the Civil War, St. Louis no longer served as respite from sectionalism. Instead, it became
a microcosm of the America’s moral and economic divisions- revealed in the city’s
deteriorating cultural and financial institutions.

1

The St. Louis Arsenal contained a reserve of weapons and artillery that appealed to both the Union and
Confederacy. See: Arenson, Great Heart of the Republic, 78.
2
This included an intense, and long running guerilla war over the state’s constitutional convention decision
to stay in the Union. For many fanatically pro-southern Democrats, secession was the state’s only viable
option to continue the institution of slavery in the state, and they protected it in the same spirit of “bleeding
Kansas”-through violent and brute force. For more information about the guerilla warfare in Missouri
during and after the Civil War, see: William E. Parrish’s, A History of Missouri, Volume III: 1860 to 1875
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973, reprinted in 2002), Mark W. Geiger, Financial Fraud and
Guerilla Violence in Missouri’s Civil War, 1861-1865 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), and
Christopher Philips’ Missouri’s Confederate: Claiborne Fox Jackson and the Creation of Southern Identity
in the Border West (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000).
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In effect, sectionalism bookended St. Louis’s history, with regional divisions
evident in the city’s founding fabric, and eventually undermining its preeminence in the
1850’s. Beginning with the first Americans to occupy St. Louis, various residents sought
to shape Manifest Destiny to suit their individual economic and political interests. The
Civil War, inconsequence, revealed these deep-seated divisions and the St. Louis
community succumbed to sectional tensions.

In exploring the key themes and trends that shaped St. Louis, it becomes
immediately apparent that the cultural clash between Northern and Southern values
played a profound role in the make-up and direction of the Know Nothing Party in the
city. The leading party members utilized populist rhetoric to portray St. Louis as the best
and only hope for Republic virtue and sacrifice. Neither strictly nativist nor completely
egalitarian, Nativists in St. Louis were moved instead moved by a profound belief in
institution building, hoping that social and economic reforms would unify the Missouri
region, and in time, the nation. This hope, however, dimmed as sectional tensions and
slavery politics consumed Missouri politics.

This fact helps to shed light on the inhabitants of the region, and demands
inclusion in the broader narrative of antebellum American politics. A study of St. Louis
and the greater Western region helps reveal what both united and divided Americans in
the nineteenth century. While Manifest Destiny drove Northern and Southerners into the
region under a divine belief in American expansionism, it also revealed the dueling
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visions of American progress, with Southerners determined to spread slavery in the West,
and Northerners busy designing a thriving capitalist economy. Inevitably, individual
ambitious, national politics, and an unstable economy sunk both the Know Nothing Party,
and the first great city in the West.
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